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I. INTRODUCTION
The European Community (EC) is currently adopting comprehen-
sive new legislation within the framework of its internal market program,
which is expected to transform the way business is conducted in the EC.I
By December 1992, the Community should be well on its way to becom-
ing an integrated economy,2 with about 320 million consumers. Not sur-
prisingly, the number of mergers and acquisitions in the EC across
national boundaries is increasing in response to the prospects of a larger
I The Single European Act [hereinafter the Single Act], 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 169) 1
(1987), which was signed in February 1986 and which entered into force in July 1987, amends and
complements the Two Treaties of Rome creating the European Economic Community and the Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community (Euratom), March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 and 298 U.N.T.S.
169 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1958), and the Treaty of Paris setting up the European Coal and Steel
Community (ECSC), April 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (entered into force July 23, 1952). The
Single Act spells out certain objectives of the Community including: completion of the European
internal market and the creation by 1992 of a great area without frontiers; technological develop-
ment; progress towards economic and monetary union. The Single Act also includes measures to
improve the workings of the Community's institutions and to institutionalize cooperation among
Member States in the field of foreign policy. See Lonbay, The Single European Act, 11 B.C. INT'L. &
COMP. L. REv. 31 (1988); Usher, The Institutions of the European Communities after the Single
European Act, 19 BRACTON L.J. 64 (1987); Campbell, The Single European Act and its Implications,
35 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 932 (1986); Berman, The Single European Act: A New Constitution for the
Community, 27 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 529 (1989).
2 For a detailed study of the 1992 Single Market project, see HAFBAUER, EUROPE 1992: AN
AMERICAN PERSECTIVE (1990); see also Jones, Putting '1992' in Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L &.
Bus. 463 (1989).
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consumer base and greater market opportunities.3 The new EC Regula-
tion "On the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings"4 is one
element of the EC's ambitious program5 . It represents the European
Community's first attempt to establish a trans-national systematic
merger control system and is intended to become the cornerstone of the
EC's competition policy.
The Regulation gives the European Commision the jurisdiction to
scrutinize mergers and joint ventures of a "Community dimension". The
Commission is to follow the Regulation's criteria to determine whether
the proposed action creates or strengthens a "dominant position" and
thereby impedes competition in the EC. Companies planning mergers or
joint ventures are required to notify the Commission of planned actions
and get clearance. The new Regulation has been the subject of several
commentaries since its adoption by the Council of the European Com-
munities on December 21, 1989.6
The Commission has since published important Guidelines on how
3 Recent surveys have traced the sharp increase in European cross-border mergers and acquisi-
tions. In 1989, Peat Marwick for example reported that the number of such deals in Europe rose to
1,314 from 847, with a respective increase in value to $50 billion from $31.6 billion. Wall St. J., Jan.
29, 1990, at A5.
In sharp contrast to the rise of activity in Europe, merger and acquisition activity in the United
States has significantly decreased. "Figures from IDD Information Services show the value of
United States M&A [Mergers and Acquisitions] activity dropping 43.3 per cent to $I 12.4bn from
198.3bn in the first half of the year.... The dollar value of European deals rose to $66. lbn from
$55.6bn, while the number of deals rose 22.7 per cent to 2,184." Fin. Times, July 3, 1990, at 22, col.
1."
4 Council Regulation No. 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings
(hereinafter "the Regulation"), 32 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 395) 1 (1989). Because of errors in the
various language versions of the Regulation as originally published, a corrected version of the
Merger Control Regulation was published. 33 OJ. Eur. Comm. (No. L 257) 13 (1990). The
Changes in the English version are mostly of minor significance.
5 The European directive on takeovers and the European Company Law project also provide an
important contribution to the development of a legal framework for businesses in the EC. The aim
of the so-called Thirteenth Company Law Directive is to govern the way European takeovers are
conducted. Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning
Takeover and other General Bids, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 64) 8 (1989); see also Basaldua,
Towards the Harmonization of EC-Member States' Regulations on Takeover Bids. The Proposal for a
Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 487 (1989); Common Rules
for Takeovers in the EC Begin to Take Shape, Fin. Times, Jan. 24, 1990, at 2; Richardson, Removing
Barriers to Company Takeovers, EIU EUROPEAN TRENDS No. 1, at 67 (1990). For the European
Company project, see Statute for the European Company: Commission Memorandum to Parliament,
the Council and the Two Sides of Industry, BULL. EUR. COMM. Supp. 3/88, at 20. See also Carreau
and Lee, Towards a European Company Law, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 501 (1989).
6 See e.g. Jacquemin, Horizontal Concentration and European Merger Policy, 34 EUR. ECON.
REv. 539-550; Fine ECMerger Control in the 1990v" An Overview of the Draft Regulations, 9 Nw. J.
INTL. L. & Bus. 513 (1989).
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the regulation will be implemented.7 The Regulation on Notifications
outlines the Commission's review procedure for a proposed concentra-
tion. Most critical, a form to be used by companies to notify the Com-
mission of a Concentration is provided as an Annex to the Regulation on
Notifications. The Notice regarding Ancillary Restraints defines which
concentration related restrictions will be assessed under the merger con-
trol provisions. And the Notice Regarding Concentrative and Coopera-
tive Operations defines joint ventures which will be considered
"concentrations" and therefore reviewed under the new Regulation.
Much like the United States Department of Justice Guidelines on United
States merger control,8 the EC Commission Notices do not have the ef-
fect of law but rather articulate the principles the administering authori-
ties will use in applying the Regulation.9 In any event, these Guidelines
promise to play a crucial role in the development of the EC's merger
control system.
On September 21, 1990, the Regulation entered into force. It is di-
rectly applicable in the Member States1° and affects foreign and Euro-
7 Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2367/90 of 25 July 1990 on the Notifications, Time Limits
and Hearings Provided for in Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the Control of Concentrations
between Undertakings, [hereinafter "Regulation on Notifications"], 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No L 219)
5 (1990); Commission Notice Regarding Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations, [hereinafter "No-
tice Regarding Ancillary Restraints"], 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No C 203) 5 (1990); Commission No-
tice Regarding the Concentrative and Cooperative Operations under Council Regulation (EEC) No
4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, [hereinafter
"Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations"], 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. 10 (NO. C
203) (1990).
8 In 1968, the U.S. Department of Justice issued merger guidelines indicating the standards
used to determine whether to challenge a merger. 1968 United States Department of Justice Merger
Guidelines, reprinted in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para. 4510. New guidelines were published in
1982. 1982 U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,493 (1982), reprinted in 2
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) para 4501. The Department of Justice refined and clarified the guidelines in
revisions issued in 1984. 1984 United States Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 49 Fed. Reg.
26,823 (1984), reprinted in The Department of Justice Manual, 1990-1 Supp., vol. 6, at 7-2A.100
(Prentice Hall, 1990) [hereinafter "1984 US Merger Guidelines"]. For a detailed analysis of the
United States merger guidelines, see Saop and Simons, A Practical Guide to Merger Analysis, 29
ANTrraUST BULL. 663 (1984).
9 For a discussion of the importance of the U.S. Department of Justice Guidelines, see Cohen &
Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New .4nti-Trust Merger Guidelines: Concentrat-
ing on Concentration, 62 TEx. L. REv. 453, 453-458 (1983).
10 Article 198 of the EEC Treaty defines four instruments which the Community institutions can
use to establish law or policy:
(i) regulations which are laws directly applicable and binding in the Member States;
(ii) directives, which are addressed to Member States and which lay down the results to be
achieved, but leave the Member States free to choose form and methods. Directives are often
used for long-term goals and politically sensitive issues;
(iii) decisions, which are binding on those to whom they are addressed, Member State, legal
entity, or private person. In the competition field, decisions issued by the Commission can have
a far-reaching impact on the behavior of companies;
(iv) recommendations and opinions, which have no binding force.
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pean companies alike. United States companies are already subject to the
EC's jurisdictional "long-arm"; a European Court of Justice decision
held that non-EC firms violate EC antitrust rules when their conduct has
an anti-competitive effect in the European Community." Moreover,
United States companies have significant and established interests in the
future single market. In 1988, United States acquisitions in Europe
nearly tripled compared with 1987. In 1989, United States corporations
were involved in a total of 182 deals and spent ECU 13.8 billion ($16.6
billion) in European cross-border mergers and acquisitions.12 For the
same period, French firms spent ECU 9.7 billion, while West German
firm spent ECU 6.7 billion.13
This article shall examine the Regulation's practical applications
and discuss its impact on business. At the outset, the article notes several
principles necessary to an effective merger control system. These princi-
ples are referred to throughout the analysis, and indicate areas of
strength and weakness in the new Regulation. In addition to attempting
a comprehensive analysis of the new European regulation, the article
makes reference to United States merger control experience where com-
parisons prove instructive. In the conclusion, the authors suggest that
where the new regulation falls short of some of these principles, the effec-
tiveness of the regulatory structure is undermined and its usefulness as a
guide for businesses and administrators is sacrificed.
More specifically, the article begins by reviewing the goals of the
EC Commission, EEC Competition Policy in the Single Market, 11 (1989).
11 Ahlstrom Osakeyhtio v. Commission des Communautes Europennes, 31 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. C 281) 16, 17 (1988); Common Mkt. Rep. (CCII) para. 18,596 (1988). This case is also known
as the "Wood Pulp" case. Most of the companies taking part in the concerted practice held unlawful
by the Commission had no subsidiaries in the EC. The Commission, nonetheless imposed fines on
them ranging from ECU 50,000 to ECU 250,000. The Court rejected the argument that the practice
was outside the territorial scope of Article 85 of the EC Treaty. It held that the decisive factor in
deciding whether the Commission had jurisdiction was where the restrictive practice was imple-
mented. The Court found that the delivery of wood pulp at concerted prices occurred in the Euro-
pean Community and thus, anticompetitive behavior of the pulp producers took place within the
Community. The Court further found that the location of the companies was immaterial since Arti-
cle 85 applies to any activity which takes place within the Community. For a detailed analysis of the
"Wood Pulp" decision, see Christoforou & Rockwell, European Economic Community Law: The
Territorial Scope of Application of EEC Antitrust Law - the Wood Pulp Judgment, joined cases 89,
104, 114, 116, 117 and 125-29/85, European Court of Justice, 27September 1988, 30 HARV. INT'L L.
J. 195 (1989).
12 US. Companies Step up European Investment, J. Comm., Mar. 14, 1990 at IA, col 3.
Although the pace of acquisitions by American companies in Europe slowed during the first quarter
of 1990, this can be viewed as a natural slowing after the important activity of 1989. See Mergers up
in Europe as Barriers Fall, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1990, at Dl, Col. 5. In the first quarter of 1990,
American companies were involved in 37 deals, representing a total reported value of $747.8 million,
compared with 53 deals in the fourth quarter of 1989, with a reported value of $4.2 billion.
13 Id.
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new Regulation and the general principles, based on the search for more
legal certainty, upon which the new Regulation relies (Section I). These
principles will serve as a yardstick throughout the analysis which fol-
lows. The second section underscores the need for merger control at the
EC level, by reviewing the trend in recent merger activity (Section II).
The third section describes the problematic treatment of mergers and ac-
quisitions prior to the new Regulation (Section III). The sections which
follow pertain directly to the new Regulation, i.e., its area of application
(Section IV); the distribution of jurisdiction between the Commission
and Member States (Section V); the procedure of review by the Commis-
sion (Section VI); and the appraisal of concentrations under the new
Regulation (section VII). Legal difficulties raised by the new mechanism
will be examined throughout. Finally, the impact of the regulation and
the practical problems concerning its implementation will be assessed
(Section VIII).
II. PRINCIPLES OF EVALUATION
A. Legal Certainty
Although 1992 has stirred interest for mergers and acquisitions
among the business community, the new opportunities raise serious con-
siderations. The Regulation, much like any law which imposes liability,
may subject a business to litigation expenses, fines and sanctions, not to
mention loss of financial and other resources. Thus before committing
significant resources to a proposed venture, a business needs to determine
with some degree of certainty that its venture will be legally viable.
14
Furthermore, uncertainty may lead to unreasonable antitrust fears and
discourage businesses from engaging in conduct which may improve effi-
ciency and heighten competition. Thus, certainty is not only a foremost
concern for businesses, but is also a concern for lawmakers and adminis-
trators who seek to promote efficient and competitive business behavior.
Legal certainty in antitrust regulation has traditionally been a major
concern. Courts and administrators in the EC and United States have
long discussed the need for certainty, 5 and the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice reiterated this concern in its 1982 and 1984 Merger Guidelines:
14 For a discussion of legal certainty under the existing U.S. and EC clearance procedures, see
McCullough, The Continuing Search for Legal Certainty: Suggestions for Improving US and EEC
Antitrust Clearance Procedures, 6 Nw. J. Itrr'L L. & Bus. 803 (1984).
15 For a discussion of certainty concerns in the United States, see Baker, Antitrust in the Sun-
shine, 21 ST. Louis U.LJ. 347, 348 (1977) ( "To facilitate an understanding of what conduct is and
is not acceptable should be a major goal of an enforcement agency."). In the EC, see C. Kerse, EEC
ANTITRUST PROCEDURES 212 (1981) ("The principle of legal certainty... has an established place
as a part of the general principles of Community law.").
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"[b]y stating its policy as simply and clearly as possible, the Department
hopes to reduce the uncertainty associated with the antitrust laws of this
area."' 16 Furthermore, the means to achieve greater certainty has been a
continuing source of tension in the United States system. 17
B. The New Regulation's Key Principles
The Commission announced several "key principles" when it pub-
lished the new Regulation in 1989.18 These principles stem from its de-
sire for improved legal certainty. The Regulation seeks to enhance
certainty in three areas: the jurisdiction to review mergers, the definition
of rules under which mergers are to be evaluated, and the Commission
clearance procedures. 19
First, the Regulation aims to remove the uncertainty which results
from the dual jurisdiction. In the past, both the Commission and the
Member States' authorities could find themselves competing for the juris-
diction over proposed mergers and joint ventures. The new Regulation
identifies one authority with exclusive power to approve or block a pro-
posed concentration. 0 To achieve this end, the EC lawmakers attempt
to establish a clear distinction between mergers with "a Community di-
mension," where the Commission will have the power to intervene, and
mergers whose impact is in the territory of one Member State, where that
Member State's national authority will retain jurisdiction. 21
Second, EC lawmakers attempt to define clear rules under which
mergers would be evaluated. The litmus test is whether the merger cre-
ates or strengthens a "dominant position" and thereby impedes competi-
tion in the European Community.22
Third, the new Regulation seeks to enhance certainty up front by
requiring firms to notify the Commission before the merger occurs. 23 In
addition, it imposes strict time limits on the Commission to respond to
notifications, thus reducing the period of uncertainty and accompanying
expense.
In sum, the new regulation attempts to establish a "one-stop" proce-
16 1984 US Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, at 7-30.
17 See Thirty-Second Annual Meeting of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Introductory Re-
marks by Phillip A. Proger, 53 ANTrrRuST L.J. 323 (1984), 323 citing Report of the Attorney Gen-
eral's National Committee to Study Antitrust Laws (1955).




22 See Article 2 of the Regulation.
23 See Article 4 of the Regulation.
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dure to address concerns of certainty.2 4 Under this procedure, there
would be one administering authority reviewing mergers under a single
body of rules.25
Before examining the Regulation in terms of these principles it is
necessary to understand the circumstances surrounding its creation.
III. INCREASED MERGER ACTIVITY IN THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY.
A. Costs and benefits of mergers from the firm's point of view
As 1992 and the prospect of a European economic unification ap-
proaches, businesses are looking for the best way to take advantage of the
single market of 320 million consumers.26 It is particularly important in
global industries for firms to sell to the European Community whose
consumers may be considered "advanced and sophisticated buyers."'27
Firms wishing to expand must choose between internal growth or exter-
nal growth by merger or acquisition. Through a merger or acquisition, a
firm can obtain assets that are already in place and this may provide a
faster return on investment than entering the market through internal
growth.2" Mergers and acquisitions enable firms to immediately enter
24 EC Competition Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan stated, "it's a one-stop shop that we are
offering to business." 1992-The External Impact of European Unification, April 7, 1989, vol. 1, no.
1, at 12. See also Fine, supra note 6, at 523.
25 Nat'l L.J., Feb. 26, 1990, col.1, at 31.
26 This market could even be larger if the EC accepts more members in the future. The applica-
tions of Malta and Cyprus are presently being considered. Turkey and Austria are possible candi-
dates, although the issue of the neutrality of Austria would first have to be solved (Ireland too has a
neutral status and belongs to the EC). Applications from EFTA countries and Eastern Europe are
expected in the next few years. Moreover, EFTA is increasingly adopting the same standards as the
EC, and there are some talks about a European Economic area that would constitute a free trade
zone between the EEC and EFTA. This would represent a market of 380 million people. Further-
more, it is not inconceivable that Eastern European countries become associated to the European
Economic Community in the near future. For a discussion of the Malta and Cyprus applications, see
EC Enlargement, Mediterranean Minnows, THE ECONOMIST, July 21, 1990, at 50. For a discussion
of the European Economic Space between the EEC and EFTA, see Finland Out in the Cold, THE
ECONOMIST, Sept. 8, 1990, at 58. The term european Space has been replaced by European Eco-
nomic Area (EEA). See Sweden and Norway, Push and Pull, THE ECONOMIST Nov. 3, 1990, at 62.
27 M. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 607 (1990).
To sustain competitive advantage in global industries, a firm must sell to all significant country
markets. Particularly important are nations that contain advanced and demanding buyers. All
of the most advanced and sophisticated buyers are rarely located at home, even under the best
circumstances. Identifying sophisticated buyers in other nations will help the firm understand
the most important new needs and create pressures that stimulate rapid progress in products
and services. Nations with sophisticated buyers may well be where leading international com-
petitors are based, making it all the more challenging to penetrate them.
28 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the European Community, EUR. EcON. No.
40 (May 1989), Commission of the EC, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs,
[hereinafter "Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC"] at 14.
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into new geographical and product markets and thereby exploit the ad-
vantage of being first in place. Flexibility is another benefit. Entry into a
new product or geographical market is less risky by acquisition of an
existing company than by internal growth.2 9 Exit is also easier since it is
quicker to sell a financial stake than to dispose of fixed assets. 30 Further-
more, acquisition of a competitor increases the acquirer's market share
and enlarges its market without creating excess capacity.31
Economies of scale is another significant benefit attributed to merg-
ers. Firms may attain the optimum efficient scale through mergers and
acquisitions. They can maximize the benefits of the division of labor,
spread fixed costs over large volumes of output and combine the factors
of production in a more efficient manner.32 Reduction in transaction
costs amounts to further economies of scale. Where asymmetric access
to information or to specific assets and human resources exists, it may be
cheaper to merge with a firm that already possesses the required informa-
tion, assets, brands, distribution networks or management than to obtain
these resources through the market.3 3 Firms may also benefit from
"scope economies" by extending their product range. "Scope econo-
mies" posit that the cost of producing two products together is lower
than the sum of the cost of producing them separately.34 Above all,
mergers and acquisitions provide firms with the size and means necessary
to finance research and development and thereby lead to technological
progress.
35
The possible drawbacks of mergers and acquisitions are akin to
those typically associated with large organizations. Poor communica-
29 Id. at 15.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 14.
32 Id. at 17.
33 Id. at 20.
34 Id. at 17.
35 Adams and Brock, The Bigness Mystique and the Merger Policy Debate: An International
Perspective, 9 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 1 at 5-7 (1988); see also J. Shumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism,
and Democracy at 81-106 (1942).
As soon as we go into details and inquire into the individual items in which progress was most
conspicuous, the trail leads not to the doors of those firms that work under conditions of com-
paratively free competition but precisely to the doors of the large concerns - which, as in the
case of agriculture machinery, also account for much of the progress in the competitive sector -
and a shocking suspicion dawns upon us that big business may have had more to do with
creating that standard of life than with keeping it down." Id. at 82.
Thus it is not sufficient to argue that because perfect competition is impossible under modem
industrial conditions - or because it always has been impossible - the large-scale establishment
or unit of control must be accepted as a necessary evil inseparable from the economic progress
which it is prevented from sabotaging by the forces inherent in its productive apparatus. What
we have got to accept is that it has come to be the most powerful engine of that progress and in
particular of the long-run expansion of total output... Id. at 106.
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tion, failure to cut out costly duplication, and insufficient coordination
may restrict flexibility.36 Some studies suggest that there are no gains in
profitability and growth from mergers.37 Reasons for failure of mergers
and acquisitions include paying too high a price for an acquisition, over-
estimating the potential of the acquired business and inadequately man-
aging the process of integration after the acquisition.3" Some who warn
against the rush for cooperation between competitors in Europe argue
that although the short-term effects may look favorable (lower overhead
costs and less duplicated efforts combined with less competition), in the
long run dominant firms may not innovate and update because of the
lack of competing local rivals and problems of coordination. 9 Studies by
the European Commission have concluded that mergers and acquisitions
are not a panacea to improve competitiveness and that the general pre-
sumption in favor of horizontal mergers is not justified.'
The above arguments deal with the threat to competition created by
an increasing merger activity and should be kept in mind when evaluat-
ing the new merger Regulation. From an United States firm's perspec-
tive however, mergers and acquisitions remain an attractive way to take
advantage of the European Market. The negative results from empirical
research on the success of mergers in Europe do not take into account
the dynamic market conditions that are now being created by the 1992
program.41 Furthermore, there is an important distinction between de-
fensive mergers of companies which formerly competed in the same mar-
ket, and mergers designed to gain access to new markets.42
36 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 20.
37 See Adams & Brock, supra note 35. Adams and Brock demonstrate that the creation of
European industrial giants through mergers and acquisitions during the 1960s and 1970s did not
improve efficiencies. They also compare the European experience to the superior efficiency-creating
effect of the deconcentration that took place in Japan. See also Schmidt, The Bigness Mystique and
the Merger Policy Debate." A Comment from West Germany, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 618 (1989);
Saxonhouse, Japan and the Bigness Mystique, 9 Nw. J. INr'L. & Bus. 612 (1989). For studies ques-
tioning the enhanced efficiency from mergers from an American point of view, see Herman & Low-
enstein, THE EFPICIENCY EFFECTS OF HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY, WORKING
PAPER No. 20 (Jan. 1986) (available at Center for L. & Econ. Stud., Colum. Univ. Sch. of L.);
Ravenscraft & Scherer, Mergers and Managerial Performance (Jan. 1986) (Federal Trade Comm'n
Working Paper No. 137); Ravenscraft & Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers (Jan. 1986) (Federal
Trade Comm Working Paper No. 136); Mueller, Mergers and Market Share, 67 REV. ECON. &
STATS 259 (1985); Diversification Blues, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, May-June 1987, at 13-14.
38 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 22.
39 Porter, Europe's CompaniesrAfter 1992, Don't Collaborate, Compete, THE ECONOMIST, June 9,
1990 at 17.
40 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 22.
41 Id.
42 As Professor Michael Porter of the Harvard Business School explains: ... expanding inter-
nationally is more important than dominating the home market. Mergers giving access to foreign
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One of the major concerns of non-EC companies "is that they will
be discriminated against in gaining access to the EC market after
1992".' 3 However, EC officials have consistently stated that a unified EC
market implies increased competition from both EC companies and non-
EC companies.' By establishing a presence in the EC now, non-EC
companies can benefit from equal treatment and equal opportunity
within the EC.45 Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome grants nationals of
EC countries a right of establishment in other EC countries.' Two re-
quirements must be satisfied to benefit from the Treaty's right of estab-
lishment: the company must be formed under the law of a Member State,
and it must have its registered office, central administration or principal
place of business within the EC.47 The Treaty of Rome also provides
that nationals of EC Member States shall have equal investment opportu-
nities in each others' countries.4" However, the qualification of "EC
markets are far better for dynamism than combining with leading domestic competitors. St-
Gobain's purchase of a British glass distributor, for instance, is more likely to enhance competitive
advantage than is Siemens's takeover of its computer-making rival Nixdorf." Porter, supra note 39,
at 19. For example, in the first quarter of 1990, McGraw-Hill Inc. Standard & Poor's Ratings
Group bought financial rating services in Britain and France The group's President, Leo O'Neill
declared, "the most efficient way to establish a business abroad is to buy companies there." Mergers
up in Europe as Barriers Fall, N.Y. Times, Jul. 5, 1990, at Dl, col. 5.
43 Heleniak & Farrell, Developments in the Law of Mergers and Acquisitions: Cross-border Trans-
actions, 2 20TH ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 143 (1988) at 203.
44 Id. at 205-206.
45 Id. at 203.
46 Article 52 of the Treaty of Rome states:
"Within the framework of the provisions set out below, restrictions on the freedom of establish-
ment of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State shall be abolished by
progressive stages in the course of the transitional period. Such progressive abolition shall also apply
to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or subsidiaries by nationals of any Member
State established in the territory of any Member State.
Freedom of establishment shall include the right to take up and pursue activities as self-em-
ployed persons and to set up and manage undertakings, in particular companies or firms within the
meaning of the second paragraph of Article 58, under the conditions laid down for its own nationals
by the law of the country where such establishment is effected, subject to the provisions of the
Chapter relating to capital."
47 Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome states:
"Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and having their
registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the Community shall,
for the purposes of this Chapter, be treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of
Member States.
"Companies or firms" means companies constituted under civil or commercial law, including
cooperative societies, and other legal persons governed by public or private law, save for those which
are non-profit-making."
48 Article 221 of the Treaty of Rome states:
Within three years of the entry into force of this Treaty, Member States shall accord nationals
of the other Member States the same treatment as their own nationals as regards participation in the
capital of companies or firms within the meaning of Article 58, without prejudice to the application
of the other provisions of this Treaty.
304
Merger Control in the European Community
11:293(1990)
company" is not restricted by any condition of actual control or national-
ity of shareholders or management.49 Thus, EC companies wholly
owned by non-EC companies are included under the establishment provi-
sion of the Treaty of Rome.50 Non-EC-based companies as well as EC-
based companies will continue to use mergers and acquisitions as part of
their overall strategy to improve their position within the "Single Mar-
ket." Effective use of these options requires an awareness of the different
laws and regulations, whether at the national or at the Community level,
that govern the different aspects of mergers and acquisitions."
B. Forms of merger or cooperation between firms.
External growth can be sought in several ways among which are full
"legal mergers", takeovers, and joint ventures. They all involve some
sort of economic cooperation.52 The choice of a particular technique de-
pends on criteria such as the speed, the degree of flexibility and revers-
ibility of the operation.53 In a "legal merger", the assets and liabilities of
two or more companies are transferred to a single newly-formed or ex-
isting company.54 The acquired companies disappear into a new com-
pany without a liquidation procedure, and their shareholders receive
shares in the acquiring or newly-formed company.55 Compared to alter-
native forms, a legal merger leads to a more thorough integration of the
companies and is reversible only at high cost.56 Until a framework of
European legal rules is completed, intra-European mergers must be car-
ried out under national company laws.
In a takeover situation, the acquiring company acquires a sufficient
number of shares to obtain control of another company. Takeovers may
49 Heleniak & Farrell, supra note 43, at 204. However, this interpretation is controversial and
some argue that actual control should be taken into consideration in this context.
50 Investment regulations of the Member States have in fact restricted this possibility and the
decision of whether or not to allow the establishment of a branch by a foreign company is currently
in the discretion of national authorities. Heleniak & Farrell, supra note 43, at 204. However, the
importance of E.C. laws is increasing significantly and can be expected to supplant some of the
national restrictions.
51 For a description of the information publicly available about a target, the scope for the target
to frustrate or delay the acquirer's action and the regulation of takeover activities in the EC coun-
tries, see, MacLachlan & Mackesy, Acquisitions of Companies in Europe-Practicability, Disclosure,
and Regulation: an Overview, 23 INT'L L. 373 (1989).
52 However, for purpose of the Regulation, joint ventures are not considered to result in a "con-
centration" when their object or effect is the coordination of the conduct of companies which remain
independent. The Regulation, art. 3 para. 2. See infra notes 135-210 and accompanying text.
53 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 28, at 16.
54 Id. at 14.
55 Basaldua, supra note 7, at 488.
56 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 14.
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involve purchasing shares from other companies, buying up shares on the
stock market or public takeover bids. Unlike "legal mergers", the compa-
nies whose shares are acquired remain in existence.57
Economic cooperation between firms can also take the form of con-
tractual arrangements under which separate firms work together on a
project, as separate legal entities.5" Such arrangements are highly flexible
and easily reversible. A joint venture is another form of a cooperative
agreement, whereby two or more companies combine to create a new
legal entity. For the purpose of competition policy, joint ventures may
present the same risks as mergers.59 Thus, the new Regulation provi-
sions on mergers control include certain joint ventures within its scope. 6°
The number of mergers in the EC has sharply increased in recent
years. The total number of mergers and acquisitions of majority holdings
involving at least one of the top 1,000 EC firms has been steadily increas-
ing since 1984.61 Such mergers have grown from 296 in 1985/86 to 415
in 1986/87 to 558 in 1987/88.62 A breakdown of these figures shows that
mergers of firms from the same Member State increased from 188 in
57 Basaldua, supra note 7, at 488.
58 A European legal framework is now available for such cooperation arrangements. The Euro-
pean Economic Interest Grouping ("EEIG") was created on July 25, 1985 and became effective on
July 1, 1989. 28 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 199) 1 (1985). A total of five EEIGs were registered in
1989. Commission of the EC, 23rd General Report of the Activities of the European Communities
(1989) at 121. See also Carreau & Lee, supra note 7.
59 See the 1977 "De Laval-Stork" decision, Commission Decision of 25 July 1977 relating to a
proceeding under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 215) 11 (1977). The
Commission found that a joint venture could have the same economic effects as a partial merger
where the partners put their existing production facilities or marketing organizations into the joint
venture and ceased to be actual or potential competitors. In that case, the Commission found that
Article 85(1) was applicable to the joint venture, but found that under Article 85(3) it was exempt
from the Article 85 prohibition. See infra notes 74, 82-94 and accompanying text.
60 See infra notes 142-188 and accompanying text.
61 The EC Commission publishes in its annual Report on Competition Policy an analysis of
mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures involving Community-scale firms. The analysis is based on
data gathered from the specialist press on operations involving at least one of the 1,000 largest firms
in the EC, according to their financial data. The data is divided in three categories: (i) mergers,
including both takeovers and voluntary amalgamation, and acquisition of majority holdings in com-
panies; (ii) acquisitions of minority holdings; and (iii) industrial and commercial joint ventures.
COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 16TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 216
(1987). The data is further broken down in: national operations, Le- mergers of firms from the same
Member State; Community operations, Le. mergers from different Member States; international op-
erations, Ze. mergers of firms from Member States and third countries that have an effect on the
Community market. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 18TH REPORT ON COMPETI-
TION POLICY 234 (1989).
62 For 1985/86, see 16TH REPORT ON COMPETITION, supra note 64, at 217 (1987). The refer-
ence period is June 1985 to May 1986. Id. at 216. For 1986/87, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITY, 17TH REPORT OF COMPETITION POLICY 228 (1988). For 1987/88, see COMMISSION
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, 18TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 234 (1989).
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1985/86, to 290 in 1986/87, to 321 in 1987/88. For the respective time
periods, mergers of firms from different Member States in the EC went
from 65, to 90, to 146 and mergers of firms from Member States and
third countries with effect on the Community market went from 43, to
35, to 91. In 1987/88, the increase in merger cases in the industrial sec-
tor (excluding services) was accounted for entirely by international 6a
(+241%) and Community operations" (+48%).65 A significant
number of cases involved combined revenues exceeding ECU 5,000 mil-
lion (108 cases) and ECU 10,000 million (60 cases).66 The number of
joint ventures (including national, Community and international) has
shown similar increases. There were 102 joint ventures in 1985/86, 121
in 1986/87, and 164 in 1987/88.67 For joint ventures in the industrial
sector involving extra-Community firms in 1987/88, the United States
came first with 16 operations out of a total of 35 cases, followed by Japan
with 5 cases.68
Interestingly enough the motivation behind mergers changed in
1987/88. The predominant motivation for mergers became the rein-
forcement of market position in light of the emerging single market.69
For the same period, the primary motivation behind joint ventures was
research and development.7 ° The EC Comhmission indicates that the
strong increase in Community and international operations shows that
companies from the EC and other countries are preparing for 1992.71
However the Commission warns that the anticipated economic benefits
from the single market would be severely restricted if merger activity
during the adjustment period increases monopoly power.7 z
Regulation of mergers and acquisitions at the European level was
necessary in this context of growing activity. Regulation was also needed
because control of mergers prior to the new regulations proved to be
unsatisfactory.73
63 Such as defined supra note 61.
64 Such as defined supra note 61.
65 18th REPORT ON COMPETITON POLICY, supra note 61, at 235.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 234.
68 Id. at 239.
69 Id. at 240.
70 Id. at 241.
71 Id. at 245.
72 Id.
73 The new Regulation does not cover every situation. Thus the "old" system, described infra in
Section III, is still applicable to mergers that do not have a "European dimension".
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IV. THE CONTROL OF MERGERS IN THE EC PRIOR TO THE NEW
REGULATION
Prior to the Regulation adopted in December 1989, the European
Community merger law was derived from two sources: (1) national
merger laws; and (2) Community law contained in Articles 8574 and 867"
of the Treaty of Rome.
A. National Merger Laws
Several Member States already possessed their own systems of
merger control prior to the adoption of the EC Regulation.76 Nonethe-
74 Article 85 provides:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all agreements
between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which
may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and in particular those
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connec-
tion with the subject of such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to the Article shall be automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the case of:
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertaking;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable to the
attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a
substantial part of the products in question.
75 Article 86 states:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or
in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market insofar as it
may affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading
conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of supple-
mentary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection
with the subject of such contracts.
76 See generally, MacLachlan and Mackesy, supra note 54, at 380-382. The most developed
systems of merger control are in the U.K., Germany and France. In Spain, a 1963 regulation per-
mitting the government to intervene to control agreements that restrict free competition is not used
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less, the national laws of the EC member States that are in place have
noteworthy differences. It is interesting to note that Germany is the only
EC Member State that uses a test similar to that established in the new
EC regulation, namely whether a particular merger "creates or strength-
ens a dominant position." However, it cannot be predicted whether the
EC Commission will interpret and enforce this statutory standard in the
same manner as the German Federal Cartel Office. Furthermore, the
standard of review under German law is not entirely similar to that
under the EC regulation. German merger control can also be compared
to that of the United States, in that it tries to establish a balance between
the anticompetitive effects of a merger and its possible procompetitive
effects." Yet since the early 1970s, the merger control policies of the two
countries have diverged in their approaches to achieve greater business
efficiency. 78 Under French law, important mergers are controlled by the
Ministry of the Economy, and the Competition Council.79 The Competi-
tion Council is required to determine whether "the concentration makes
a great enough contribution to economic progress to offset damage to
today. Belgian laws controlling the abuse of economic power are not aimed at controlling mergers.
Id. Italy, which until recently did not have such a regulation, adopted a merger control law in
September 1990 largely based on the EC Regulation.
77 The German merger control law, is encompassed in the Restraints of Competition Act
(Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrankungen) of July 27, 1957, 1957 BGBL.I 1081 (effective January
1, 1958). It was amended several times: Amendment to the Restraints of Competition Act of August
3, 1973, 1973 BGBL.I 917; Act of September 24, 1980, 1980 BGBL.I 1761; Act of October 22, 1987,
1987 BGBL.I. 2294; Act of December 22, 1989, 1989 BGBL.I 2486 1990 BGBL.I 235.
78 Ponsoldt and Westerhausen, Competition and/or Efficiency: a Review of West German An-
timerger Law as a Model for the Proposed Treatment of Efficiency Promotion under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 9 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 296 (1988) at 300. This article shows that faced with difficult
economic conditions and increased competition from abroad, Germany and the United States
adopted different policies. Germany's merger control policy kept putting the emphasis on the neces-
sity to have economic competition between numerous firms. In contrast, the United States' policy
has shifted towards a less interventionist attitude.
79 Ordinance No. 86-1243 of December 1, 1986, reprinted in Bermann, De Vries and Galston,
French Law, Constitution and Selective Legislation (Release No. 8, 1989) 5-48, Title V On Economic
Concentration. Article 38 indicates that the Minister of the Economy may submit to the Competi-
tion Council for its opinion concentrations that reach a certain threshold (25 percent market share or
7 billion francs of sales) and that are likely to injure competition "particularly by creation or rein-
forcement of a dominant position." Article 40 states that companies can choose to notify the Minis-
ter of Economic Affairs of a concentration. If they choose to do so, the failure of the Minister to
refer the merger to the Competition Council within two months amounts to tacit approval. If the
merging companies do not notify, the Minister can refer the merger to the Council at any time. The
Council can then oppose the merger or subject it to special conditions.
Article 42 states:
The Minister of the Economy and the minister responsible for the economic sector concerned
may, subsequent to the opinion of the Competition Council, by a reasoned order fixing a time-
limit, order the enterprises either not to carry out the scheme of concentration or to restore the
status quo ante, or to modify or complete the operation or to take any measure appropriate to
assure or reestablish sufficient competition. Id. at 5-76, 5-77.
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competition."8 ° Merger Control in the United Kingdom involves the
Department of Trade and Industry, policy maker and executive, the Of-
fice of Fair Trading, which advises the Secretary of State for Trade and
Industry on the decision whether to allow a merger or to require a more
detailed investigation. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission
(MMC) is an independent body which investigates certain mergers re-
ferred to it by the Department of Trade and Industry. The MMC uses
the "public interest" test to determine whether a merger should be al-
lowed." If the MMC finds that the merger is not against the public in-
terest, the merger can proceed. However, if the MMC finds the merger
against public interest, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry can
still allow it or can impose conditions for the merger to proceed.
In addition, prior to the new regulation, national courts of the Mem-
ber States were often requested to apply Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome in unfriendly takeover situations.
B. Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome to
Merger Control
The Treaty of Rome did not expressly empower the Commission to
control mergers. Nonetheless, Article 8582 of the treaty which controls
anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices, and Article 8683
which prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, were (and still are to a
certain extent, as discussed in section VIII A of this article) applied to
certain mergers prior to the new regulation. 4
In the Continental Can decision, 5 the Commission maintained that
Article 86 was applicable, because the merger strengthened the dominant
enterprise to such a degree that actual or potential competition was elim-
inated. Although the European Court of Justice set aside the Commis-
sion's decision because of deficient findings of facts, 6 it established the
principle that a dominant company commits an abuse of its dominant
position when acquiring a competitor, because it reinforces its domi-
nance.8 7 However, Article 86's applicability in the merger area is limited
80 Article 41 of Ordinance No. 86-1243; see supra note 79.
81 See Fair Trading Act of 1973, reprinted in 47 HALSBURY'S STATUTES (Fourth Ed. 1988) 125.
See also MacLachlan and Mackesy, supra note 54, at 381.
82 See supra note 74.
83 See supra note 75.
84 For description of the development of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome from the
drafting of the Treaty to the situation prior to the adoption of the new Regulation, see, Banks,
Mergers and Partial Mergers under EEC Law, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 255 (1988).
85 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L7) 25 (1972).
86 Europemballage Corp. v. Commission & Continental Can Co., I Eur. Ct. Rep. 215 (1973).
87 Id. at 245.
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because it can only be used where one of the merging firms has a domi-
nant position before the merger and increases its position with the
merger. Thus, mergers that fall under the prohibition of Article 86 are
those which place the dominant firm in a top rank, particularly in terms
of market share.88
It was long believed that Article 85 did not apply to mergers.89
However, in 1987, the European Court of Justice upheld Article 85's
application to a merger in the Philip Morris case.9 The Court upheld the
Commission's position that in certain circumstances, the acquisition of
shares in a competing company would fall under Article 85's prohibition.
The Court, however, rejected the argument that the acquisition of a
shareholding in a competitor had necessarily a restrictive effect on com-
petition. The Court indicated that the key test for determining whether
the transaction fell under Article 85, was the influence which the acquisi-
tion would have on the companies' conduct. The Court did not say
whether Article 85 would apply to the acquisition of a majority stake or a
straight buy-out of a competing company.9" It is unclear how far Article
85's application will be expanded in the field of mergers and acquisitions.
In August 1988, the Commission set a precedent by intervening for
the first time before the completion of a takeover in the Irish Distillers
Group case.92 The Commission ruled that a United Kingdom beverage
consortium led by Grand Metropolitan PLC, violated Article 85 by
agreeing to buy Irish Distillers Group at a potentially artificial price and
by agreeing to divide the beverage market by apportioning the brand
names among the members of the consortium. The Commission based its
decision on the existence of a collusive practice under Article 85.
Because of the increasing intervention of the Commission in concen-
tration cases under Articles 85 and 86, it became apparent that Member
States should adopt a formal control regulation at the European level.93
It was thought that companies would benefit from having only one set of
88 Gleiss, COMMON MARKET CARTEL LAW 369 (1978).
89 Id. at 363-364; COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, THE PROBLEM OF INDUS-
TRIAL CONCENTRATION IN THE COMMON MARKET 33-36 (1966); COMMISSION OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY 17TH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 31, point 29-32 (1978).
90 British-American Tobacco Company and RJ. Reynolds Industries v. Commission, 30 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 329) 4 (1987), 10 Eur. Ct. Rep. 4566 (1987). See also, Calkoen & Feenstra,
Acquisition of Shares in other Companies and EEC Competition Policy: The Philip Morris Decision, 16
INT'L Bus. LAW. 167 (1988).
91 Commission Of The European Community, XXIst General Report On The Activities Of The
European Communities 365 (1987).
92 Irish Distillers Group v. Gc&C Brands Ltd., 4 Common Mkt. Rep. 840 (1988); see also Lee,
M&A Activity Booming in Europe, Nat'l L.J., May 15, 1989, at S4.
93 Fine, supra note 6.
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Community merger laws. Moreover, neither Article 85 nor 86 provide a
satisfactory code for the control of mergers. One of the goals of the new
Regulation was to remedy these problems. Among the major shortcom-
ings of applying the Treaty Articles are: (a) the fact that efficiency bene-
fits of concentrations can only be taken into consideration under Article
85 but not under Article 86; (b) the uncertainty of the informal clearance
procedure, and (c) the lengthy process.94
1. Efficiency benefits of concentrations can only be taken into
consideration under Article 85, not under Article 86
Article 85 sets forth the general rule that prohibits restrictive prac-
tices which affect Community trade. However, Article 85(3) creates an
important exception to that rule. The prohibition of Article 85 can be
declared inapplicable by the Commission (and not by the national courts)
if the harmful effects of a restrictive agreement or practice are sufficiently
counterbalanced by a number of beneficial elements. Article 85(3) lists
four conditions which must all be met before an exemption can be
granted by the Commission:9"
(i) the agreement must contribute to an improvement in production or
distribution, or economic progress. There must be a clear objective advan-
tage involved, such as a reduction of costs or an increase of production
capacity;
(ii) a fair share of the resulting benefits must be allowed to consumers.
This might take the form of lower prices or an improvement in the quality
of the goods or services;
(iii) only restrictions of competition which are indispensable in order to
achieve the beneficial results will be allowed;
(iv) competition exists with respect to a substantial part of the goods or
services in question.
9 6
-Thus, Article 85(3) provides an exemption for transactions, which
although found to be anti-competitive, improve production or distribu-
tion, or promote technical or economic progress in the European Com-
munity. These are known as "efficiency benefits" under United States
antitrust law terminology. Yet, such exemption does not exist for trans-
actions found to violate Article 8,6. 9'
94 As explained infra Section VIII A of this article, these Articles still apply to mergers that do
not have a "Community dimension" as defined by the new Regulation. Thus, problems mentioned
below potentially remain for these types of mergers.
95 Article 85(3), see supra note 74.
96 EC COMMISSION, EEC COMPETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET 19 (1989).
97 Lee, supra note 92.
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2. Uncertainty of the Informal Clearance Procedure
Articles 85 and 86 do not require the pre-notification of a merger,
nor provide for formal clearance procedures, nor grant the Commission
the authority to block a deal.98 The Council of Ministers adopted Regu-
lation 17, 99 which has been described as "the enforcement arm" of Arti-
cles 85 and 86.100 That regulation established the procedure to obtain an
exemption under Article 85(3) and created the negative clearance
procedure. 10 1
Another type of clearance is the so-called "comfort letter." 102 It en-
ables parties, in straightforward cases, to obtain informal clearance from
the competition directorate of the Commission known as the "DG IV"
(Directorate General IV). 103 Interviews take place with a member of the
DG IV's staff, and if there is no problem, the staff member recommends
to the Director General of the DG IV that no action be taken.104 Parties
can obtain a "comfort letter", which states that the Commission is un-
likely to object to the proposal based on the facts available to it. How-
ever, a "comfort letter" is not legally binding on the Commission. 105
98 Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, see supra notes 77, 78; see also Lee, supra note 94.
99 Regulation 17/62, O.J. EUR. COMM. 204/62; O/J. (special Edition 1959-62), at 57 (came into
force on March 13, 1962).
100 Fine, supra note 8, at 523.
101 McCullough, supra note 16, at 844.
102 Id
103 The Directorate General for Competition (DG-IV) is responsible for implementation of the
rules of competition under the EEC Treaty and the ECSC Treaty. It is organized into five depart-
ments. Directorate A is responsible for the formulation of general competition policy, legislative
initiatives, and relations with other EC and international institutions such as the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Directorate B is responsible for investigating
and prosecuting cases under Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty with respect to the following
sectors: (a) mechanical and electrical engineering, electronics, automobile, and telecommunications;
(b) textiles, clothing, and manufacturing industries; and (c) distribution-based businesses, banking,
insurance, and the media (radio, television, press). Directorate C is responsible for investigating and
prosecuting cases under Articles 85 and 86 with respect to: (a) energy, chemicals, and agricultural
and food products; and (b) non-ferrous metals, non-metallic mineral products, wood, paper, and
construction, as well as cases pursuant to the rules of competition of the ECSC Treaty relating to
steel and coal, and transport. Directorate D coordinates the activities of Directorates B and C, and
reviews their cases from a non-sectoral perspective. It is composed of four divisions, each focused on
a different type of business practice: (a) horizontal restrictive practices and abuses of dominant posi-
tion; (b) mergers, joint ventures, and cooperation agreements; (c)industrial and intellectual property
rights; and (d) distribution agreements. Directorate E is responsible for industrial aid policies. See
WINTER, SLOAN, LEHNER, AND Ruiz, EUROPE WITHOUT FRONTIERS: A LAWYER's GUIDE, 167
(1989).
104 Lee, supra note 94.
105 EC COMMISSION, EEC COMPETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET 55 (1989). The
Commission recently instituted the practice of publishing a notice of its intention to issue an admin-
istrative letter (or "comfort letter") in certain cases, allowing parties to react before it takes further
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3. Lengthy process
Informal clearance procedures usually take one month.10 6 If the
Commission has reservations, or the target company or a third party files
a complaint with the Commission, formal notification has to be made in
order to obtain either a "negative clearance" or an exemption under Ar-
ticle 85(3).1O7 The Commission is not constrained to render a decision
within any time frame and this process takes several months. Somtimes
an investigation may take more than one year. 0 8
C. Evolution of the New Regulation and Implementing Guidelines
In response to the problems under the existing system, the Commis-
sion submitted the first proposal for a European regulation on the control
of mergers in 1973.l1 However, because adoption required unanimous
approval, opposition by several member states delayed the process.110
After much compromise and several additional amendments,111 the
Council of Ministers of the European Community finally adopted an
steps. This enhances the value of such administrative letters. Id. See also McCullough, supra note
16, at 868.
106 Lee, supra note 92.
107 Agreements between enterprises may be submitted to the Commission to seek a decision that
the agreement does not violate Article 85(1) at all (this is a negative clearance) or that the agreement
does fall under Article 85(1) but meets the conditions for exemption under Article 85(3). "Although
the correct terminology is 'application for negative clearance' and 'notification for exemption', the
term 'notification' is used for both possibilities. In fact, applicants will normally submit one notifica-
tion to the Commission seeking negative clearance or, in the alternative, individual exemption." EC
COMMISSION, EEC COMPETITION POLICY IN THE SINGLE MARKET 45. No fines may be imposed
for the period from the moment of notification until the Commission reaches a decision. When an
agreement meets the four requirements of Article 85(3), described supra note 74, an exemption can
be granted, either on an individual basis or by mean of a group exemption. Notification is not
required for agreements that fulfill the conditions contained in so-called group-exemption regula-
tions, which exist with respect to certain categories of agreements (e.g. R&D agreements, franchising
agreements, know-how licensing agreements). See id at 19-20.
108 McCullough, supra note 16, at 870.
109 Proposal for a Regulation of the Council on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertak-
ings, 16 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C92) 1 (1973).
110 1992: The External Impact of European Unification, April 7, 1989, vol. 1, no. 1, at I (BNA
Bi-weekly). The United Kingdom was among the nations opposing the regulation's adoption, and
sought to minimize the number of mergers subject to Commission intervention by fixing the impact
threshold at a very high level. Id.
111 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Un-
dertakings, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 36) 3 (1982); Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation
on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 51) 8 (1984);
Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings,
29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 324) 5 (1986); Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Control of Concentrations Between Undertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989); See
also, Potter, Centralized European Merger Regulation: a Viable Alternative, 26 VA. J. INT'L. L. 219,
239-249 (1985), (explaining the reasons for the proposed regulations' failure to gain approval).
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amended proposal on December 21, 1989.112 The new Regulation be-
came effective September 21, 1990.113
The Commission drew up guidelines in advance of the Regulation's
effective date to provide important information on the Regulation's likely
application. Draft guidelines were made available to the business com-
munity during the past year, and the final Guidelines were published on
August 14, 1990.114
V. SCOPE OF THE REGULATION ON MERGER CONTROL IN LIGHT OF
THE IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES
A. Overview of the Key Issues
Several key issues outline the scope of the new Regulation. A quan-
titative threshold must be met in order for a proposed merger to qualify
for consideration under the new Regulation. Once this quantitative
threshold is met, the treatment of the proposed merger hinges on
whether it can be deemed a "concentration". The sections which follow
focus on these two major issues and also outline the distinction between
joint ventures that are within the scope of the Regulation and joint ven-
tures that are not.
B. Quantitative threshold
The Regulation confers jurisdiction on the Commission to deter-
mine whether certain proposed mergers which exceed a specified thresh-
old are compatible with the common market. 115 Only concentrations
considered to have a "Community dimension", are subject to the Com-
mission's review. The threshold for a concentration to have a "Commu-
nity dimension" is currently set as follows:
1 16
(a) the aggregate worldwide turnover 1 7 of all the parties con-
cerned taken together must be more than 5,000 million ECU 118 and
112 For a description of the law-making process in the EC before and after the Single European
Act, see Crijns, Some Aspects of the Decision-Making Process in the European Communities, 5 Nw. J.
INT'L. L. & Bus. 902 (1983); Lonbay, supra note 3, at 59-61; Usher, supra note 3, at 64.
113 The Regulation, art. 25.
114 See supra note 9.
115 The Regulation Article 1(2).
116 The Regulation Article 1(2).
117 "Aggregate turnover" is defined to "comprise the amounts derived by the undertakings con-
cerned in the preceding financial year from the sale of products and the provision of services falling
within the undertakings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales rebates and of value added tax
and other taxes directly related to turnover." The Regulation, art. 5.
118 ECU 5 billion is currently about $6.95 billion at the Nov. 14, 1990 exchange rate.
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(b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover119 of each of at least
two of the parties concerned must be more than 250 million
ECU.12°Even if the initial quantitative threshold is met, the regulation
will not apply if each of the parties concerned achieves more than two-
thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover within only one Mem-
ber State.'2 1 In this case, the concentration is considered to be essentially
national and the national law of the concerned Member State is applica-
ble. The regulation provides for the threshold to be revised by the Coun-
cil which must vote as a qualified majority on the Commission's
proposed revisions by the end of 1993.122
Because the quantitative threshold would directly affect the reach of
Community law vis-a-vis Member State autonomy, 123Member States had
difficulty in reaching agreement.124 The Commission would have pre-
ferred a threshold lower than the final 5 billion ECU figure.125 West
Germany and the United Kingdom proposed a 10 billion ECU threshold;
they reasoned that a lower threshold would encompass too many trans-
actions and overload the Commission.126 The threshold finally adopted
was a compromise between various Member States and the Commission's
previously proposed 1 billion ECU, 12 7 The 1 billion ECU threshold
would have reached 150 mergers per year.12 The 5 billion figure is
viewed by many as too high because it leaves numerous concentrations in
the jurisdiction of Member States.129 The adopted threshold is expected
to reach between 30 and 50 mergers a year.130 At the end of the review
period, a decrease in the threshold to 2 billion ECU is expected, and this
will reach an estimated 80 transactions per year (at current levels). 131
Article 5 of the Regulation describes the methodology to calculate
119 See note 117.
120 The Regulation, art. 1(2).
121 This provision is commonly referred to as the "national two-thirds exception." Nat'l L. J.,
Feb. 26, 1990, col. 1, at 31.
122 The Regulation, art. 1(3).
123 For example, a threshold of ECU 1 billion would mean that 90 percent of all sectors would be
covered by Community law, while a ECU 2 billion threshold would cover only 85 percent. 1992:
The External Impact of European Unification, supra note 112, at 12.
124 Lee, supra note 94.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Amended Proposal for a Council Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Un-
dertakings, 32 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 22) 14 (1989).
128 Lee, supra note 94.
129 EC Practitioners Question Ability to Deliver Effective Merger Review, 58 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 58, at 53 (1990). A former director in the commission's Directorate General
IV stated: "While its threshold is extremely high, the merger regulation represents a start."
130 Id.
131 Lee, supra note 94.
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revenue. 132 The aggregate revenue does not include sales rebates, value
added taxes, and other revenue taxes. 13 3 Also, sales between subsidiaries
or companies related through one of the following ways, should not be
taken into account when calculating aggregate revenue of the group:
ownership by one company of more than half of the capital or assets of
the other; power by one company to exercise more than half of the voting
rights of the other; power of one company to appoint more than half the
members of the board of the other; right of one company to manage the
affairs of the other.
134
Special rules are provided for assessing the revenues of banks, other
financial institutions and insurance companies. 135 This highly complex
methodology may lead to some uncertainty in determining which trans-
actions fall within the scope of the new regulation.
C. Meaning of the term "concentration"
The new Regulation applies "to all concentrations with a Commu-
nity dimension."' 136 The term "concentration" is broadly defined in Arti-
cle 3 as encompassing mergers and acquisition of "direct or indirect
control of the whole or parts" of one or more companies, "whether by
purchase of securities or assets, by contract or by any other means."'
137
This definition covers all the forms of cooperation described earlier in
this paper.138 Particularly, the Regulation includes friendly and hostile
takeover bids,139 and certain joint ventures."4
Whether joint ventures constitute "concentrations" is an important
question in determining the scope of the regulation. Joint ventures are
132 A detailed description of this complex methodology is beyond the scope of this article. We
will limit ourselves to some general indications. The Commission published a form to be used by
companies to notify the Commission of a concentration with a Community dimension. See Form CO
Relating to the Notification of a Concentration pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89,
[hereinafter "Form CO"], 33 O.. EuR. CoMM. (No L 219) 11, published as annex I to the Regula-
tion on Notifications, supra note 9. The form provides examples on how to calculate worldwide
turnover for credit and other financial institutions, for insurance companies, and for joint ventures.
Id. at 19-22.
133 The Regulation, art. 5(1).
134 The Regulation, art. 5(4)(a).
135 The Regulation, art 5(3). See also, Form CO, supra note 133, at 19-21.
136 The Regulation, art. 5(1).
137 The Regulation, art. 3(1)(b).
138 See supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
139 Fine, supra note 6, at 515.
140 Article 3(2) of the Regulation states: "The creation of a joint venture performing on a lasting
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not give rise to coordination of
the competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between them and the joint venture,
shall constitute a concentration within the meaning of paragraph 1(b)."
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frequently used for cross-frontier cooperation in the EC."4 1 The new
Regulation on merger control covers joint ventures only to a limited ex-
tent. This is viewed as one of the weaknesses of the Regulation. 142
Briefly stated, if a joint venture's effects are close to those of a merger, it
is covered by the Regulation. By contrast, the new Regulation does not
cover operations that coordinate the activities of companies which re-
main independent. Such operations are considered like cartel agreements
and remain to be assessed under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome. The Commission published a notice to clarify the distinction be-
tween "concentrative" and "cooperative" operations 143 that is intended
to define which joint ventures will be assessed under the new Regulation.
1. Cooperative v. Concentrative Joint Ventures.
Only "concentrative joint ventures" are covered under the new Reg-
ulation.11 "Concentrative joint ventures" are designed to function as (i)
141 EC Economic and Social Committee, Opinion on the Implementing Provisions for a European
Regulation on the Control of Concentrations between Undertakings, [hereinafter Opinion of the ESC
on the Implementing Provisions] 33 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 225) 60, at 63. "Pending the adoption
of further laws for different forms of Community-wide companies such as the European company,
the joint venture organized under national company law is an established vehicle for cross-frontier
cooperation in areas ranging from Community R&D to marketing." Id. The Economic and Social
Committee is a consultative body whose opinion must be sought in many cases before a Commission
proposal can be adopted by the Council, during the law making process of the EC. It is composed of
189 members who represent employers, trade unions and other interested groups such as farmers
and consumers. The Opinion of the ESC on the Implementing Provisions represents the opinion of
the business community. We will also refer in this article to the position of the American Chamber
of Commerce in Belgium, whose position papers are more detailed. "The EC Committee of the
American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium is the key organization in Europe representing the
views of European companies of American parentage. As such it represents some of the earliest and
most committed business supporters of the European ideal and, in particular, of the Single Market
concept." The EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, EC Committee
Position Paper Regarding Revised Draft Commission Notice on the Distinction between Concentrative
and Cooperative Operations under the Merger Control Regulation, June 29, 1990. [hereinafter EC
Committee Position Paper on Draft Notice]. The EC Committee of the American Chamber of Com-
merce in Belgium has been one of the most active organization trying to influence the EC Commis-
sion drafting of the guidelines on the application of the new Regulation. Even if the Chamber
provides a particular prospective, the authors believe that its views are useful in identifying potential
problems for all businesses in the EC.
142 Opinion of the ESC on the Implementing Provisions, supra note 142, at 63. The Economic
and Social Committee indicates that that weakness "will be remedied only in part by a Commission
notice." Id.
143 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7. The Notice indi-
cates, general principles that "will be followed and further developed by the Commission's practice
in individual cases." Id. at para. 4. The notice does not provide a definitive answer to all conceiva-
ble situations. Furthermore, the Notice "is without prejudice to the interpretation which may be
given by the Court of Justice or the Court of First Instance of the European Communities." Id. at
para. 5.
144 The Regulation, art. 3(2).
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autonomous economic entities, and (ii) do not involve coordination of
competitive behavior between the parent companies themselves, or be-
tween the parent and the joint venture.145 On the other hand, "coopera-
tive joint ventures" are still subject to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of
Rome and their implementing regulations.' 46 "Cooperative joint ven-
tures" involve the coordination of the competitive behavior of the parent
companies and the joint venture. 4 7
a. Definition of a Joint Venture under the New Regulation
First, a joint venture must be an undertaking, i.e., "an organized
assembly of human and material resources, intended to pursue a defined
economic purpose on a long-term basis."' 148 Furthermore, the undertak-
ing must be jointly controlled. Joint control exists in every case where
the parent companies must agree on decisions concerning the joint ven-
ture's activities. 49 No joint control exists where one of the parents can
decide alone, which is presumed to be the case when one company "owns
more than half of the capital or assets of the undertaking, has the right to
appoint more than half of the managing or supervisory bodies, controls
more than half of the votes in one of those bodies, or has the sole right to
manage the company's business."' If one of the parent's holdings is, by
its nature or its extent, insufficient to establish sole control, and if there is
no joint control together with third parties, then there is no concentra-
tion within the meaning of the Regulation.' 5 ' It has been suggested by
the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium' 5 2 that the Notice
should specify that the provisions giving the minority shareholders a veto
limited to matters important for the protection of their investment' 53 do
145 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 142, Article II(B).
146 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 142, at para. I. The
applicable Regulations are: Regulation No. 17, O.J. EUR. COMM. No. 13, 21.2.62, at 204/62; or
Regulation (EEC) No. 1017/68, OJ. EUR. COMM. (no.L 175), 23.7.68, at 1; No. 4056/86, O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No.L 378), 31.12.86 at 4; or No. 3975/87, O.J. (No. L 374), 31.12.87 at 1. For an analysis
of the treatment of research and development joint ventures under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome,
see Zwart, Innovate, Integrate, and Cooperate: Antitrust Changes and Challenges in the United States
and the European Economic Community, 1989 UTAH L. REv. 63, 79-87, 91-95, 100-101 (1989).
147 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 6.
148 Id. at para. 8.
149 Id. at para. 11.
150 Id. at para. 12.
151 Id. at para. 14.
152 See supra note 141.
153 For example, amendment of the by-laws; capital changes; sale of substantial part of assets;
major changes in lines of activity; borrowing exceeding specified limits; and, selection of key
managers.
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not "tilt the balance towards joint control." '154 The Position Paper notes
that joint control should exist only if the minority shareholders' veto ex-
tends to decisions regarding commercial activities of the undertaking.'" 5
b. Conditions for a Joint Venture to be covered by the New
Regulation
Once an undertaking is established to be a joint venture, it must
fulfill the following two conditions to be reviewed under the new
Regulations.
L The joint venture must perform all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity on a lasting basis
This condition reflects the idea that the creation of the joint venture
must result in a real structural change in the market. Such permanent
structural change is considered to be more beneficial than cartel-type
agreements between firms and therefore deserve a different treatment.
Joint ventures that take on only specific and partial responsibilities from
their parent are merely auxiliaries to the parent companies and are not
considered to be concentrations.15 6 In order to be covered by the new
Regulation, the joint venture must be intended to and able to carry on its
activity for an unlimited or, at least, long term period. 5 7 The Commis-
sion will look at the agreed or expected life of the joint venture and more
importantly, at the nature and quantity of human and material resources
of the joint venture.' If the parties can ensure the joint venture's exist-
ence and independence in the long term, the joint venture will be consid-
ered to have a lasting basis and fulfil one of the conditions to be
scrutinized under the new Regulation and not under Article 85 and 86 of
the Treaty of Rome. It can be assumed that escape clauses permitting
termination of the joint venture under defined circumstances, such as
force majeure, commercial failure, deadlock of the shareholders, or the
acquisition of one parent by competitors of the other are not incompati-
ble with the long term nature of a joint venture.159
A decisive factor in the Commission's assessment of the autonomous
character of the joint venture is whether it is in a position to exercise its
own commercial policy. 1 ° However, the Commission will not challenge
154 EC Committee Position Paper on Draft Commission Notice, supra note 151, at Point 1.
155 Id.
156 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 143, para. 16.
157 Id. at para. 17.
158 Id.
159 EC Committee Position Paper on Draft Notice, supra note 143, at Point 2.
160 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 143, at para. 18.
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a joint venture's independence "merely because the parent companies re-
serve to themselves the right to take certain decisions that are important
for the development of the JV [joint venture], namely those concerning
the alterations of the objects of the company, increases or reductions of
capital, or the application of profits." '161
iL The joint venture must not be accompanied by any coordination of
the competitive behavior of the companies involved.
For a joint venture to be considered concentrative within the mean-
ing of the new Regulation,162 coordination either between the parent
companies or between the parent companies and the joint venture cannot
be the reason for the establishment of the joint venture, nor may it be the
consequence of the joint venture's activities.' 63 The Commission none-
theless recognizes that joint ventures generally are a vehicle for parent
companies to pursue common or mutually complementary interests and
that such concordance of interests is an essential feature of a joint ven-
ture, whether it is cooperative or concentrative.' 64 The Commission's
Notice, however, suggests that if the cooperation goes beyond a certain
level, the joint venture will be considered cooperative and will not be
covered by the new Regulation.1 65 The membership of the joint ven-
ture's managing and supervisory bodies is an important factor to be con-
sidered by the Commission. 166  The Commission indicates that
"[c]ommon membership of the J-V's and the parent companies' decision-
making bodies may be an obstacle to the development of the JV's autono-
mous commercial policy.
167
The Commission stated that the decisive factor to determine the dif-
ference between concentrative joint ventures, subject to the new Regula-
tion, and cooperative joint ventures, subject to scrutiny under Article 85
and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, 168 is not the legal form of the relationship
of the parent companies between themselves and with the joint venture,
but the actual and potential effects of the establishment and operation of
161 id at para. 19.
162 Article 3(2), sub-paragraph 2 of the Regulation.
163 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 144, at 12 para. 20.
164 Id. at para. 21.
165 Id. at para. 22. "Mhe risk of coordination will be relatively small where the parents limit the
influence they exercise to the JV's strategic decisions, such as those concerning the future direction




168 Supra notes 77 and 78.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 11:293(1990)
the joint venture on market relationships.
169
c. Particular Situations
The Commission identified four different situations in the Notice
Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, each correspond-
ing to a presumption of either concentrative or cooperative behavior, and
one situation corresponding to a grey area.
170
i. Joint ventures that take over pre-existing activities of the parent
companies.
These joint ventures are presumed to be concentrative, since there is
normally no risk of coordination where the parent companies transfer all
their activities to the joint venture and withdraw from the joint venture's
market. 171 When the parent companies transfer their entire business as-
sets to the joint venture, and thus act only as holding companies, the
Commission views the operation as a complete merger from an economic
point of view.172 Some members of the business community173 recom-
mended that it be stated explicitly that only one of the two parents has to
withdraw irreversibly and permanently from the market for the joint
venture to be presumed concentrative. 74 For example, the formation of
a joint venture between a purchaser and a seller might be a first step
towards a subsequent complete acquisition by the purchaser. In such
situation, the purchaser does not irreversibly and permanently withdraw
from the market, but the transaction constitutes a concentration and
should be reviewed from the outset under the new Regulation.
175
The Commission's draft notice further indicates that when the joint
venture takes on only some of the activities of the parent companies, it
can also amount to a concentration. 176 However, for the joint venture to
fall under the new Regulation, its establishment and operation "must not
lead to a coordination of the parent companies' competitive behaviour in
relation to other activities which they retain."' 177 To determine whether
the parents have withdrawn from the joint venture's market, the commis-
169 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 144 at para. 23.
170 Id. at para. 24 to 36.
171 Id. at para. 25.
172 Id. at para. 26.
173 The article's references to the "business community" are generally those interests expressed
by the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, since it is one of the main lobbying groups in
the EC. See supra note 141.
174 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 142, at point 5.
175 Id.
176 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 144, at para. 27.
177 Id.
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sion will examine whether they are actual or potential competitors of the
joint venture. The business community criticized the fact that the Notice
suggests that the presence of one or more of the parent companies in an
upstream or downstream market or a neighboring market precludes the
application of the Regulation 178
Finally, the Commission will review joint ventures, whose parent
companies remain permanently active on the joint venture's market, but
where the parent companies geographic markets are so widely separated
or present structures so different that competitive interaction may be ex-
cluded. 17 9 This point is of particular interest to United States companies
setting up joint ventures in the EC. If the parent companies' markets and
the joint venture's markets are in adjacent territories of the Community,
there is a presumption of coordination of competitive behavior between
the parent companies and the joint venture.
18 0
iE Joint ventures that undertake new activities on behalf of the parent
companies.
The Commission indicated that normally no risk of coordination ex-
ists where the joint venture operates in a product or service market which
the parent companies individually have not entered and will not enter in
the foreseeable future. 18  The Commission notes however that this as-
sessment is only true if the joint venture's market "is neither upstream
nor downstream of, nor neighbouring, that of the parent companies."
18
In the case of joint ventures that incorporate pre-existing activities of the
parent company,18 3 the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium is
concerned that the presence of parent companies in related markets will
inevitably lead to the qualification of a "cooperative joint venture."'8 4
iL Joint ventures that enter the parent companies' market.
The Commission indicated that in this case, there is a presumption
of coordination of competitive behavior between the parent companies or
between the parent companies and the joint venture.'18  As long as this
178 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 142, at point 5. The American
Chamber of Commerce in Brussels suggests that the presence of the parents on related markets
should not in all circumstances preclude the application of the Regulation. Id.
179 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 144, at para. 29.
180 Id. at para. 30.
181 Id. at paras. 31 to 32.
182 Id. at para. 31.
183 Id.
184 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 142, at point 6.
185 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 33.
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presumption is not rebutted, the Commission will consider that the es-
tablishment of the joint venture does not fall under Article 3(2), sub-
paragraph 2 of the new Regulation." 6
iv. Joint ventures that operate in upstream, downstream or neighboring
markets.
Here again, the Commission seems to set a presumption that if the
joint venture is operating in a market that is vertically or horizontally
close to that of the parent companies, and when they are competitors, it
is a cooperative joint venture."8 7 The American Chamber of Commerce
expressed its concern that this "seemingly irrebuttable presumption" is
unwarranted and that such an approach risks making the category of
concentrative joint ventures obsolete.' The American Chamber of
Commerce also disagrees with the concept that a supply or procurement
agreement between a parent and the joint venture for a substantial part of
the sales or the purchases of the joint venture should preclude the appli-
cation of the Regulation,1 9 in the absence of other circumstances point-
ing to coordination of competitive behavior. 19
2. Acquisition of Minority Shareholdings
"The taking of a minority shareholding in an undertaking can be consid-
ered a concentration in the meaning of Article 3(l)(b) of the Regulation
if the new shareholder acquires the possibility of exercising a decisive
influence on the undertaking's activity".
191
The remainder of the Notice section is confusing since it mostly analyzes
situations that fall under Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. 192
The EC Committee of the American Chamber of Commerce objects
strongly to the statement that a non-controlling shareholding in a com-
petitor without more must be presumed to lead to a coordination of com-
petitive behavior.'93
3. Cross-Shareholding.
"In order to bring their autonomous and hitherto separate undertakings
or groups together, company owners often cause them to exchange share-
146 Id.
187 Id. at para. 34.
188 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 141, point 7 and 8.
189 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 35.
190 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 141, at point 8.
191 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 37.
192 Id.
193 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 141, at point 9.
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holdings in each other. Such reciprocal influences can serve to establish
or to secure industrial or commercial cooperation between the undertak-
ings or groups. But they may also result in establishing a 'single eco-
nomic entity.' In the first case, the coordination of competitive behavior
between independent undertakings is predominant; in the second, the re-
sult may be a concentration"."
The Commission recognizes that the Regulation concerns not only legal,
but also economic concentrations. The Commission believes that two or
more companies can merge economically without establishing a parent-
subsidiary relationship and without losing their legal personality.1 95 In
the case of an economic concentration, the Commission will consider the
operation to be within the scope of the Regulation if the undertakings or
groups concerned "are not only subject to a permanent, single economic
management, but are also amalgamated into a genuine economic unit,
characterized internally by profit and loss compensation between the var-
ious undertakings within the groups and externally by joint liability."19 6
4. Representation on Controlling Bodies of other Undertakings.
The Commission's analysis of common membership of managing or
supervisory boards will take into account the same principles as in cross-
shareholdings. 197 Whether common membership of the respective
boards is a means of coordinating the competitive behavior of the under-
takings concerned, or of concentrating the companies in the meaning of
the Regulation will depend on the circumstances of the case.198 The eco-
nomic link between the shareholding and the personal connection will be
an important factor in the analysis.19 9 The Commission indicated that a
majority of seats on the managing or supervisory board of a company
creates a presumption of control of that company." ° This presumption
is reasonable. However, the Commission also established a "virtual pre-
sumption"2 "1 that a minority of seats implies influence on the commer-
cial policy of the company, "which may further entail a coordination of
behavior."202 Such a presumption is questionable because financial rea-
sons may justify this kind of arrangement e.g., anti-takeover measures
194 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 40.
195 Id. at para. 41.
196 Id
197 Id. at para. 42.
198 Id. at para. 44.
199 Id.
200 Id at para. 45.
201 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 141, at point 11.
202 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 45.
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and not commercial policy.2 "3
5. Transfer of Assets or Shares.
Asset transfers fall under Article 3(1)(b) of the Regulation solely if
the acquirer gains "control of the whole or parts of one or more under-
takings."204 On the other hand, when the transfer of assets is linked with
an agreement to coordinate the competitive behavior of the companies
concerned or is accompanied by such a coordination, it must be ex-
amined according to Article 85 and 86 and their implementing regula-
tions.2 "5 The Commission however draws a distinction between
unilateral and reciprocal arrangements. For unilateral arrangements, it
establishes a presumption that the Regulation is applicable. A reciprocal
acquisition of assets or shares, on the other hand, is viewed as accompa-
nying an agreement between the companies concerned about their invest-
ment, production or sales, and therefore indicative of coordination of
their competitive behavior.20 6 This presumption has been criticized for
not taking into account the fact that an exchange of assets may follow,
for example, from the uncoordinated wish of each company to acquire
specified facilities of the other which results in a negotiated swap.207
6. Joint Acquisition of an Undertaking with a view to its Division.
When several undertakings jointly acquire another, the Commission
will apply the principles established for the assessment of a joint ven-
ture,208 if the period of joint control "goes beyond the very short
term.' '2 9 In this case, the Regulation will be applicable if the joint ven-
ture is found to be concentrative. If the sole object of the agreement is to
agree to divide up assets of the acquired company and this agreement is
made effective immediately after acquisition, then the Regulation
applies.210
It can be seen from this analysis that the guidelines on the scope of
the Regulation are disappointingly restrictive for much likely joint ven-
ture activity. Moreover, the Regulation and Guidelines leave many ques-
203 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 141, at point 11.
204 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 46.
205 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 46. For
the regulations implementing Articles 85 and 86, see supra note 145.
206 id. at para. 47.
207 EC Committee Position Paper on the Draft Notice, supra note 142, at point 12. According to
the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium, in this context "[ilt is surely wrong under the
Regulation to presume an anti-competitive purpose without supporting evidence." Id.
208 See supra notes 156-169 and accompanying text.
209 Notice Regarding Concentrative and Cooperative Operations, supra note 7, at para. 48.
210 Id.
Merger Control in the European Community
11:293(1990)
tions unresolved. In particular, the distinction between joint ventures
treated under the new Regulation and those treated under Articles 85
and 86 remains unclear, and will result in substantial uncertainty until
eventual clarification by the European Court of Justice.
VI. COMPETENCE (OR JURISDICTION) TO REvIEw
CONCENTRATIONS
In principle, the Regulation provides that the Commission will have
exclusive jurisdiction for mergers with a Community dimension211 (these
concentrations have been defined by the quantitative threshold discussed
above),212 while the Member States will have jurisdiction for other merg-
ers. Thus, in principle, Member States may not apply their national leg-
islation on competition to concentrations with a "Community
dimension." However, the Regulation contains numerous exceptions to
this principle.
The many exceptions to the exclusive competence of the Commis-
sion are the result of compromise between Member States. For most
Member States, the thought of giving the Commission exclusive jurisdic-
tion over mergers amounted to relinquishing part of their sovereignty.213
Thus, some of the exceptions were viewed as safeguard clauses.
1. As noted above,214 a transaction will be excluded from the
Commission's competence if each of the firms involved derives more than
two-thirds of its EC revenues within one and the same Member State.215
2. In response to pressure from the West German government,216
it was agreed that when a merger might lead to overconcentration in a
"distinct" market in a single Member State, that State may be permitted
to apply its national laws to a concentration with Community dimen-
211 The Regulation, art. 21(2).
212 See supra notes 115-135 and accompanying text.
213 States within the United States had similar sovereignty concerns at the beginning of the
United States antitrust regulation era. The law in the United States has developed such that anti-
trust control occurs at the federal level, but states can adopt legislation which is not inconsistent.
See Exxon Corp. v. Gov. of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978); Shell Oil Co. v. Gov. of Maryland 439
U.S. 884; and Continental Oil Co. v. Gov. of Maryland 439 U.S. 884. Jurisdiction under United
States antitrust statutes is based on the "effect on commerce" theory. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773 reh'g denied 423 U.S. 886 (1975). Under the theory, activities which "are wholly
local in nature, yet substantially affect interstate commerce" fall within the jurisdiction of the federal
laws. See United States v. Aguafredda, 834 F.2d 915, cert denied Augostino v. U.S., 108 S. Ct. 1278
(1987).
214 See supra notes 115-135 and accompanying text.
215 The Regulation, art. 1(2).
216 This provision reflects the so-called "German Clause". Merger Control in the European Com-
munity, Fin. Times, Jan. 1990.
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sion.217 Some believe this concession has been framed in such restrictive
terms that it can be expected to have a limited application.218 A "dis-
tinct" market in the relevant products or services is a market in which
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous, and where
the market can be distinguished from neighboring markets with different
competitive conditions.219 Difficulties relating to the determination of
the distinct market are likely to arise.
3. Article 21(3) of the Regulation reserves to the Member States
the possibility of protecting certain "legitimate interests" other than
competition related matters in concentrations with Community dimen-
sion. The regulation gives the following examples of such "legitimate
interests": public security, plurality of the media and prudential rules
(meaning the rules of prudential supervision applied for the surveillance
of financial institutions).220
4. Upon the Commission's request, a Member State "shall" under-
take an investigation of a transaction found to have a "Community di-
mension", on the Commission's behalf.221 This amounts to a power
given to the Commission to use the Member States staff to supplement its
own resources.
5. Finally, the Regulation allows a State to refer to the Commis-
sion matters otherwise reserved to the Member States. Specifically, the
Commission may intervene in mergers below the threshold at the invita-
tion of a Member State.222 This provision was designed for the Member
States that do not have their own antitrust laws.223
The determination of the competence to control concentrations re-
mains a source of uncertainty. Particularly, there might be a risk of par-
allel investigations by the Commission and national authorities. A
"legitimate interest" investigation224 by a Member State may run in par-
allel with inquiries by the Commission. However, a Member State cannot
in that case authorize a concentration that has been blocked by the Com-
mission. Thus, if the Commission's proceeding ends by a decision that
the concentration is incompatible with the common market, the Member
State's procedure becomes redundant. Only in cases where the Commis-
sion reaches a decision allowing the concentration may the Member
217 The Regulation, art. 9.
218 Internal Markets, EIU EUROPEAN TRENDS No. 1, 14 (1990).
219 The Regulation, art. 9(7).
220 The Regulation, art. 21(3), subpara. 2.
221 The Regulation, art. 12.
222 The Regulation, art. 22(3).
223 See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
224 The Regulation, art. 21(3).
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State's procedure be effective. In cases where the Commission has per-
mitted a Member State to apply its own law under the distinct market
procedure, nothing precludes the Commission from conducting its own
parallel investigation.225
Another example of grey area in the respective jurisdiction of the
Commission and Member States is the Commission's intervention at the
request of a Member State. Under Article 22(3), the Commission may
only intervene in a concentration under the threshold, if trade between
Member States is affected by that concentration.226 Article 22 (3) can be
used to prevent dominant positions which impede competition within the
territory of a Member State. However, the regulation does not provide
any specific test to assess whether a concentration impedes competition
within a Member State. Thus, the Commission must apply the test of
compatibility with the common market, which may lead to some difficulty
in this context. Moreover, the Commission's intervention at the request
of a Member State, is an exception to the principle that Member States
are competent over all concentrations which do not have Community
dimension. In practice, that the Commission can only intervene in con-
centrations which have an effect on trade between Member States may
create problems since the Commission's action will consequently have
some impact on Member States, other than the one that requested the
Commission's intervention.
The Commission has issued a statement on Article 22, saying that a
concentration will not be considered as having a significant effect on
trade between Member States if the parties have combined worldwide
revenues of less than 2 billion ECU, or if one of the parties has a Com-
munity turnover of less than 100 million ECU, or if two-thirds of the
Community-wide turnover of each party is in the same Member State.
Therefore, as a practical matter, the Commission's intervention under
Article 22 (3) will be limited to concentrations between 2 and 5 billion
ECU where Community turnover for each company is at least 100 mil-
lion ECU.
A request by a Member State for the Commission's intervention
must be made "within one month at th6 most of the date on which the
225 The Regulation, art. 9.
226 Article 22(3) of the Regulation states:
If the Commission finds, at the request of a Member State, that a concentration as defined in
Article 3 that has no Community dimension within the meaning of Article 1 creates or strength-
ens a dominant position as a result of which affective competition would be significantly im-
peded within the territory of the Member State concerned it may, insofar as the concentration
affects trade between Member States, [emphasis added] adopt the decisions provided for in Arti-
cle 8 (2), second subparagraph, (3) and (4). The Regulation, art. 22(3).
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concentration was made known to the Member State or effected."' 227 A
Member State may use the Article 22 procedure in cases where the Com-
mission received notice under the new Regulation (parties may provide
notice because they are uncertain whether the proposed actions have a
"community dimension"). The one month time limit may force a Mem-
ber State desiring such intervention to request such intervention before
the Commission has determined whether the concentration has a "Com-
munity dimension". Failure to meet the 1 month time limit would fore-
close a member state from seeking Commission intervention if after the
expiration period the Commission found that no "community dimen-
sion" existed.
Parties may be fined for failing to notify the Commission of a con-
centration with a "Community dimension".228 Thus parties seeking to
avoid the penalties may choose to notify the Commission on borderline
cases; areas of uncertainty include questions concerning the quantitative
thresholds and geographic requirements, and whether transactions will
be classified as concentrations.
VII. PROCEDURE OF REVIEW BY THE COMMISSION
Basically, the Regulation requires firms falling within its scope to
notify the Commission prior to the merger, and requires the Commission
to respond accordingly within strict time limits. The following chart
summarizes the main steps of the procedure under the new regulation:
227 The Regulation, art. 22(4).
228 According to Article 14 of the Regulation, the Commission may impose fines of from ECU
1,000 to 50,000 to undertakings that intentionally or negligently omit to notify a concentration.
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Suspension of the con-
centration for at least
3 weeks from notifica-
tion.
1. Concentration not
in scope of Reg.:
approved.
2. In scope, does not
harm competition deci-
sion of compatibility.
3. In scope, harms
competition Initiation
of proceedings.
Final decision Art. Four 1. Decision of compat-
8 and 10(2) to months ibility: The concentra-
10(6) from the tion is approved.
initiation of 2. Decision of incom-
proceedings patibility The concen-
tration is blocked
The new regulation thus imposes a "report and wait" requirement
similar to the one in the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act
of 1976, in United States law.229 Companies are required to notify con-
centrations to the Commission no more than one week "after the conclu-
sion of the agreement, or the announcement of the public bid, or the
acquisition of a controlling interest. '230 The concentration may not be
completed until a three week waiting period has lapsed following the no-
tification.231 However, the Commission may decide on its own initiative
to continue the suspension of a concentration thereafter.232 The waiting
229 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). See Lee, supra, note 94.
230 The Regulation, art. 4(I).
231 The Regulation, art. 7(1).
232 The Regulation, art. 7(2).
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period is viewed as being too long, and has been labeled a "deal killer".233
With regard to that criticism it should be noted that the Commission can
waive the suspension in cases where delay may cause serious damage to
the parties or to a third party. 234 There is also a special provision for
public bids, allowing them to proceed subject to certain safeguards.235
If the Commission determines that the transaction may have a po-
tentially adverse impact on competition in the EC, it may take an addi-
tional four months from the date of initiation of proceedings to decide
whether to clear or block the deal.236 The period of four months may be
extended in certain circumstances where the Commission did not obtain
necessary information. 237 As a result, decisions on controversial concen-
trations may take up to five months.
In August 1990, the Commission published a Regulation providing
guidelines on the notification, time limits and hearings.2 38 This Regula-
tion creates the administrative framework for examining concentrations;
the period starts with the notice of concentration and runs through the
final Commission's decision.239 A form for the notification of concentra-
tions to the Commission is provided as an annex to the Regulation on
Notifications.240 The questionnaire's requirements are stringent and
some required data may be unobtainable.241 The Regulation on Notifica-
233 Lee, supra note 94.
234 The Regulation, art. 7(4).
235 Article 7 (3) of the Regulation states: "Paragraph I and 2 shall not impede the implementa-
tion of a public bid which has been notified to the Commission in accordance with Article 4 (1) by
the date of its announcement, provided that the acquirer does not exercise the voting rights attached
to the securities in question or does so only to maintain the full value of those investments and on the
basis of a derogation granted by the Commission pursuant to paragraph 4." The Regulation, art.
7(3).
236 The Regulation, art. 10(3).
237 The Regulation, art. 10(4).
238 Regulation on Notifications, supra note 9.
239 Opinion of the ESC on the Implementing Provisions, supra note 141, at 62.
240 The so-called "Form CO," supra note 132.
241 Opinion of the ESC on the Implementing Provisions, supra note 141, at 61-62. "A deluge of
information, lack of flexibility and backlogs in the processing of numerical data would be the inevita-
ble consequence. The Committee therefore appeals to the Commission to design more manageable
and appropriate procedures acceptable to all concerned." Id. at 61. For example the ESC criticizes
the request for reports, studies and surveys which were made in preparation for the concentration.
As the ESC indicates, the Commission is asking for information that was compiled for reasons other
than to be examined by competition authorities. "It would seem from the outset that these texts will
provide competition law experts with little information. The disadvantages for the parties concerned
are, however, clear, for there is no way that widely circulated sensitive data could be kept secret.
Moreover, a careful drafting of the questionnaire should lead to the Commission having the facts it
needs to examine a merger." Id. at 61-62. Information required by Form CO includes: information
on the parties to the concentration; information on the concentration, e.g., description of the nature
of the concentration, economic sectors involved, economic and financial details on the planned oper-
ation; information on ownership and control of the companies party to the concentration and on
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tions requires that twenty copies of each notification and fifteen copies of
the supporting documents be submitted to the Commission.242 Incorrect
or misleading information marks the notification as incomplete243 and
will postpone the start of the Commission's examination of
notification. 2'
If the Commission finds the notification incomplete it will inform
the notifying party "without delay."'245 The Commission will fix an ap-
propriate time limit for the completion of the information.246 The busi-
ness community has criticized this provision as adding a penalty not
provided for in the Regulation.247 They argue that parties will make best
efforts to complete their files because it is in their interest to avoid post-
poning the time from which the deadlines begin to run.2 4 8
If the Commission finds that the notified operation does not consti-
tute a concentration in the scope of the Regulation on merger control, it
may, if requested to do so by the notifying parties, treat the notification
as an application for negative clearance under Articles 85 and 86 of the
Treaty of Rome,249 or as a notification to obtain an exemption under
Article 85(3).25o In cases where notifications are conversed, the Commis-
sion may require additional information in order to assess the operation
their ownership and control of other companies, personal and financial links with other companies
which are active in the market affected by the proposed operation, including market share, sales and
pricing data for the previous three years; information on the general condition in the affected mar-
kets, including historical data on market entry, distribution and service system, and the competitive
environment; an assessment of the impact of the proposed concentration on consumers and on the
development of technical progress. See Form CO, supra note 132.
242 Article 2 (2) of the Regulation on Notification, supra note 9. Regulation on Notifications,
supra note 7, Art. 2(2). This requirement has been questioned by the business community which
noted that traditionally only 13 copies have been supplied in competition cases, one for the Commis-
sion and one for each member State. EC Committee Position Paper on the Proposed Commission
Regulation on Notification, Time Limits and Hearings Provided for in Regulation No. 4064/89 on the
Control of Concentration (Reference IV/156/90 EN), May 10, 1990, points 8, 9 (Hereinafter EC
Committee Position Paper on Proposed Regulation on Notifications).
243 Regulation on Notifications, supra note 7, art. 3(3).
244 Regulation on Notifications, supra note 7, Art. 9.
245 Regulation on Notifications, supra note 7, art. 4(2). The original draft mentioned "as soon as
possible". This requirement was strongly criticized by the American Chamber of Commerce in
Belgium. See EC Committee Position Paper on Proposed Regulation on Notifications, supra note 243,
point 10. The term "as soon as possible" has been changed to "without delay" in response to the
concern of the business community.
246 Id
247 EC Committee Position Paper on the Proposed Regulation on Notifications," supra note 242,
point 10.
248 Id
249 Regulation No. 17, supra note 101, art 2, at 204/62.
250 Regulation on Notification, supra note 7, art. 5. Exemption under Reg. No. 17/62, supra
note 101, art. 4.
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under Articles 85 and 86.251 The Regulation on Notifications allows par-
ties to request private hearings2 52 if they show a legitimate interest, or if
the Commission proposes to impose a fine or penalty on them.2 53
The Regulation on Notifications sheds some light on the procedural
requirements accompanying the Regulation on merger control. As far as
legal certainty is concerned, the Regulation on Notifications establishes
precise rules for calculating the time limits imposed upon the parties to
mergers and the Commission. Thus, the Regulation remedies the
problems arising from the lengthy procedure under Articles 85 and 86.
In addition, flexibility is provided by the possibility of conversion of noti-
fications. On the other hand, it is particularly noteworthy that the Com-
mission will have the power to suspend the time limits for each step of
the process, as a penalty on non-cooperative parties.
VIII. APPRAISAL OF CONCENTRATIONS UNDER THE NEW
REGULATION
The Commission must assess whether the concentration is compatible
with the common market. The Regulation defines this requirement as
follows: "A concentration which does not create or strengthen a domi-
nant position as a result of which effective competition would be signifi-
cantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it shall
be declared compatible with the common market. 2 54 If such a domi-
nant position is created or strengthened, the concentration is incompati-
ble with the common market.255 This provision is reminiscent of Article
86 language prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position.256 However,
the prohibition of Article 86 only applies to mergers that strengthen an
already dominant position.257 Thus, the creation of a dominant position
falls outside the prohibition of Article 86, but is covered by the new
Regulation.258
In order to assess whether a dominant position is created or
strengthened by a proposed merger, the Commission will undertake a
similar analysis to that required under Article 86.259 The Regulation
251 Regulation on Notifications, supra note 7, Art. 5(7).
252 Regulation on Notification, supra note 7, art. 13.
253 Regulation on Notification, supra note 7, art. 14(4).
254 The Regulation, art. 2(2).
255 The Regulation, art. 2(3).
256 See supra note 78.
257 Europemballage and Continental Can Co. v. Commission, see supra note 88.
258 Price, The EECand Cross Border Mergers, THE SoLIcrroRs JOURNAL, Oct. 14, 1988, at 1412.
259 Id. The Regulation does not clearly define the concept of dominant position. The European
Court of Justice has defined that term in several cases involving Article 86's prohibition of a domi-
nant position as follows:
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lists a set of criteria to be taken into account when appraising concentra-
tions.26 The May 1989 Commission report on "Horizontal Mergers and
Competition Policy in the European Community" gives some indication
as to how the Commission is likely to apply the standards set by the new
Regulation.26 This report was prepared in anticipation of the new Reg-
ulation's adoption. It suggests that the Commission will apply the new
standards in light of the precedent from the Commission's and European
Court of Justice's application of Article 86 "abuse of dominant position"
standard.262 The notification form that companies subject to the new
Regulation will have to submit to the Commission also indicates factors
that the Commission deems important when appraising concentra-
tions.263 Finally, the American experience under the U.S. Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines provides some sense of how economic criteria
are applied in merger control.264
Merger control's primary goal is to determine which mergers should
be allowed given the trade-off between the efficiency gains that may be
produced (particularly in the form of cost reduction), and the increase in
monopoly power265 which may cause higher prices.266 According to the
EC Commission, such a judgment must be based on general indicators.
Factors indicating monopoly power are: a high market share with a
"scattered competitive fringe",267 low import penetration and high entry
A position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent effective
competition being maintained on the relevant market by affording it the power to behave to an
appreciable extent independently of its competitors and utlimately of the consumers.
See Michelin v. Commission, (1975) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3461, 3503; Hoffman-LaRoche v. Com-
mission, (1979) E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 461, 520; United Brands v. Commission, (1978) E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 207, 277.
260 The Commission shall take into account:
the market position of the undertakings concerned, and their economic and financial power, the
opportunities available to suppliers and users, their access to supply or markets, any legal or
other barriers to entry, supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services, the inter-
est of the intermediate and ultimate consumers, and the development of technical and economic
progress provided that it is to consumers' advantage and does not form and obstacle to competi-
tion. See The Regulation, art. 2(1)(b).
261 See supra note 28.
262 Horizontal Merger and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 46 and 47, citing
Article 86 cases.
263 "Form CO," supra note 132.
264 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 46, citing the United
States Antitrust Division's approach to the definition of market and measure of concentration, US
Department of Justice, Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1982. See 1984 Merger Guidelines, supra note
10.
265 Market power or monopoly power refer to the same phenomenon, Le. the ability to price
above the competitive level. T. Krattenmaker, R. Lande, S. Salop, Monopoly Power and Market
Power in Antitrust Law, 76 GEORGETOWN L. J. 24, 263 (1987).
266 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 28, at 18.
267 Id. at 19.
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barriers, inelastic or stagnating demand, and a differentiated product.
268
Factors that indicate efficiency benefits from a merger include: large-scale
economies and learning effects, substantial excess capacity, and a high
capital intensity and technology content.269
The Commission's analysis of concentrations, is likely to focus on
the following elements: 1) market definition and measure of concentra-
tion; 2) assessment of ease of entry; 3) assessment of efficiency benefits
from the merger.27 The analysis will also include restrictions ancillary
to the concentration being reviewed by the Commission.271
A. Market Definition and Measure of Concentration
In order to assess the competitive impact of a given merger, the
Commission will first have to define the relevant market. The form for
notification states that "a relevant product market comprises all those
products and/or services which are regarded as interchangeable or sub-
stitutable by the consumer, by reason of the products' characteristics,
their prices and their intended use."' 27 2 The form further indicates that a
relevant product market may be composed of a number of individual
product groups.273 A theoretical way to measure interchangeability is to
calculate the crosselasticity of demand.274 A positive and high cross-
elasticity indicates that the products are interchangeable.275 In practice
this type of calculation is replaced by an analysis of the various products
to determine whether they are really interchangeable.276 Cases decided
under Article 86 give some indication of how markets are defined. For
example, in Hoffman-La Roche (1979),277 the European Court of Justice
decided that each group of vitamins formed a separate market because of
their specific metabolizing functions. The notification form states that
the product market will usually be the classification used by the company
268 Id
269 Id
270 Id at 46.
271 See infra notes 341-349 and accompanying text.
272 "Form CO," supra note 133, § 5.
273 "An individual product group is a product or small group of products which present largely
identical physical or technical characteristics and are fully interchangeable. The difference between
products within the group will be small and usually only a matter of brand and/or image." "Form
CO," supra note 133, § 5.
274 The price elasticity of demand indicates the change in quantity demanded resulting from a
change in price. It is defined as the percentage change in -quantity demanded divided by the per-
centage change in price. E. MANSFIELD, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 85 (1989).
275 Horizontal Merges and Competition in the EC, supra note 31, at 46.
276 Id
277 Hoffman La-Roche, supra note 259.
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for marketing.2 78
The Commission seems to reject the U.S. Department of Justice ap-
proach to the question of market definition, which refers to the concept
of potential substitution.279 According to the 1984 United States Merger
Guidelines, a market is defined as a group of products such that a hypo-
thetical monopolist "could profitably impose a 'small but significant and
nontransitory' increase in price."280 The Commission objects to the use
of potential competition.281 The Commission believes that evaluating the
intensity of potential competition is too subjective.282 Moreover, accord-
ing to the Commission, under the potential competition method, if cur-
rent prices already reflect monopoly power an existing dominant position
would not be identified.283 Thus, the Commission is unlikely to rely ex-
clusively on a quantitative test and will take into account the particular-
ity of each case. 284 "Opportunities available to suppliers and users ' 285
will be a key element in defining the relevant market.286
The Commission recommended that when defining the geographic
market criteria such as transportation costs, perishability of the goods,
local or regional differences and consumption habits be taken into ac-
count.287 Competition from foreign firms will also be an important crite-
ria in defining the relevant geographic market.288 In Article 86 cases, the
278 "Form CO," supra note 133, § 5.
279 1984 U.S. Merger Guidelines, supra note 10.
280 1984 U.S. Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 2.11. The method used by the Department of
Justice is further described as follows: "Specifically, the Department will begin with each product
(narrowly defined) produced or sold by each merging firm and ask what would happen if a hypothet-
ical monopolist of that product imposed a "small but significant and nontransitory" [defined in the
Guidelines as a price increase of five percent lasting one year] increase in price. If the price increase
would cause so many buyers to shift to other products that a hypothetical monopolist would not find
it profitable to impose such an increase in price, then the Department will add to the product group
the product that is the next-best substitute for the merging firm's product and ask the same question
again. This process will continue until a group of products is identified for which a hypothetical
monopolist could profitably impose a "small but significant and nontransitory" increase in price.
The Department will consider the relevant product market to be the smallest group of products that
satisfies this test."
281 Horizontal Mergers and Competition in the EC, supra note 31, at 47.
282 d
283 Id
284 The Commission report states:
This suggests that in defining the relevant market for antitrust purposes we should be wary of
relying exclusively on quantitative or mechanical tests which inevitably involve a degree of
arbitrariness, and should include qualitative analyses that take into account the special features
of each case.
Horizontal Merger and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 47.
285 The Regulation, art. 2(l)(b).
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Commission and the Court of Justice have regularly looked at imports
and potential competition from abroad when defining the geographic
market.28 9
Once the relevant market is defined, the Commission must calculate
the market's degree of concentration and then estimate the possible im-
pact of the merger.2 ° The Regulation indicates that in making its ap-
praisal, the Commission must take into account the market position of
the parties. 291 This can be assessed by determining the combined market
share of the parties after the merger. Concentration can be measured
through using the market share of the firms concerned or through using
the distribution of the market shares of all firms.
The United States merger guidelines uses the Herfindahl-Hirshman
index2 9 2 to determine the threshold at which a merger is considered dan-
gerous for competition.2 9 3 The European Commission mentions the
United States approach in its report and indicates that the use of this
index in the European context would require consideration of the degree
of openness to international trade. According to the Commission, "a
possible approach would be to calculate market shares excluding exports
out of the relevant geographic market (national or Community) and in-
cluding imports into the market. ' 291 In cases applying Article 86, the
EC Commission and the Court of Justice have used the market share of
the firm concerned.29 However, this approach has been criticized and is
289 See eg. Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v.
Commission of the Eur. Com., 1974 Eur. Ct. Rep. 223, 1974 Common Mkt. L.R. 309, and Hoffman-
La Roche (1979), supra note 275, where the Court held that the relevant market was the world
market.
290 Horizontal Merger and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 46.
291 The Regulation, art. 2(2)(b).
292 1984 U.S. Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, states:
As an aid to the interpretation of market data, the Department will use the Herfindahl-
Hirshman Index ("HHI") of market concentration. The HHI is calculated by summing the
squares of the individual market shares of all the firms included in the market...
The 1984 Guidelines offers an example of how to calculate the HHI:
A market consisting of four firms with market shares of 30 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent and
20 percent respectively has an HHI of 2600. (30x30)+(30x30)+(20x20)+(20x20)= 2,600.
The HHI ranges from 10,000 in the case of a pure monopoly (100x100) to a number approach-
ing zero, in the case of an atomistic market.
293 § 3.11 of the 1984 US Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, lays down the general standard for
horizontal mergers as follows:
(a) if the post-merger HHI is below 1000, the market is considered unconcentrated and the
Department is unlikely to challenge the merger.
(b) if the post-merger HHI is between 1000 and 1800, the Department is likely to challenge a
merger producing an increase of the HHI of more than 100.
(c) if the post-merger HHI is above 1800, the Department is likely to challenge a merger
producing an increase of the HHI of more than 50.
294 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 48.
295 The European Court of Justice in Hoffman-La Roche (1979), supra note 275, held that bar-
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unlikely to be used in implementing the new merger Regulation.2 96
The Commission's report states that concentration ratios or market
share data alone are insufficient to prove the existence of monopoly
power.297 Thus it will consider other factors such as the elasticity of
demand and entry conditions.2 98 The Commission has suggested that
high concentration or market share should only be indicators triggering
an investigation. 299 According to the Commission's report, "the investi-
gation itself should focus on the conduct, namely whether a merger is
liable to affect the interests of consumers directly or indirectly through a
substantial change in market structure.
'" 300
The preamble to the Regulation establishes a presumption known as
the "safe harbor" provision. This provision states that a concentration
will be compatible with the common market where the joint market
share of the parties "does not exceed 25 percent either in the common
market or in a substantial part of it."' 3 1 A relatively "high" share of a
market creates a presumption of a dominant position but a range of other
criteria will be taken into consideration as well. Notifying companies are
required to provide lengthy information on each "affected relevant prod-
uct market."30 2 The notifying companies must provide an estimate of the
value of the market, the revenues of each party to the concentration, an
estimate of their market share, and an estimate of the market share of all
ring exceptional circumstances, a large market share is sufficient evidence by itself of a dominant
position.
296 Horizontal Mergers and Concentration Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 48.
297 Id.
298 Id.; see also "Form Co", supra note 133 (requesting that information).
299 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 48.
300 Id
301 The 15th "Whereas" of the preamble of the Regulation reads as follows:
Whereas concentrations which, by reason of the limited market share of the undertakings con-
cerned, are not liable to impede effective competition may be presumed to be compatible with
the common market; whereas, without prejudice to Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty, an indica-
tion to this effect exists, in particular, where the market share of the undertakings concerned
does not exceed 25% either in the common market or in a substantial part of it.
The Regulation, supra note 6, at 2.
302 The "Form CO" defines "affected markets" as follows:
Affected markets consist of relevant product markets or individual product groups, in the Com-
mon Market or a Member State or, where different, in any relevant market where:
(a) two or more of the parties (including undertakings belonging to the same group as defined
in Section 3) are engaged in business activities in the same product market or individual product
group and where the concentration will lead to a combined market share of 10% or more.
These are horizontal relationships; or
(b) any of the parties (including undertakings belonging to the same group as defined in Sec-
tion 3) is engaged in business activities in a product market which is upstream or downstream of
a product market or individual product group in which any other party is engaged and any of
their market shares is 10% or more, regardless of whether there is or is not any existing sup-
plier/customer relationship between the parties concerned. These are vertical relationships.
See "Form CO," supra note 133, § 5.
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competitors having at least 10 per cent of the geographic market under
consideration.
30 3
B. Ease of Entry
A firm may exercise market power for a significant period of time
only if barriers to entry exist.304  Thus, the Commission will assess the
relative ease of entry to the market.30 5 Some of the criteria mentioned in
the Regulation are useful to assess ease of entry.3°6 The parties' eco-
nomic and financial power are relevant factors that may prevent entry.30 7
Also, access of the parties engaged in the proposed concentration to sup-
plies or markets are important factors in the identification of entry barri-
ers.308 The Regulation also mentions legal and other barriers to entry30 9,
and supply and demand trends for the relevant goods and services as
factors to be analyzed.310
The notification form requires companies to provide "a forecast of
the evolution of demand on the affected markets ' 31I and information on
the competitive environment.312 Such information gives some indication
of a greater or lesser pressure on competition. 13  If market demand is
growing, an entrant firm is more likely to reach the minimum viable
303 "Form CO," supra note 133, § 5, at 15. Moreover, such information must be provided for the
last three financial years: a) with respect to the Community as a whole, b)individually for each
Member State where the parties do business, and c) where different, for any relevant geographic
market. Section c refers to the "distinct market" provision of the Regulation.
304 Salop & Simons, supra note 10, at 679. For a discussion of barriers to entry in United States
law, see also Ordover & Wall, Proving Entry Barriers: a Practical Guide to the Economics of New
Entry, ANTrrRusT, Winter 1988, at 12. (The economic analysis is applicable in European law as
well).
305 Ease of entry is also a factor in United States merger control. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of
Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 120 n. 15 (1986) (it is "important to examine the barriers to entry into the
market, because 'without barriers to entry it would presumably be impossible to maintain supracom-
petitive prices for an extended time.' ") (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986); see also United States v. Waste Management, 743 F.2d 976, 982 (2d
Cir. 1984) (United States merger guidelines recognize not only that ease of entry is a relevant factor
in merger control, but that it may override all other factors). For an economic analysis of the ease of
entry issues, see Salop, Measuring Ease of Entry, 31 ANTrrRUST BULL. 551 (1986). (This article
mentions the U.S. Department of Justice approach, however the economic concepts are applicable to
European antitrust law as well).
306 The Regulation, art. 2(l)(b) supra note 6, at 3.
307 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 49.
308 Id.
309 Id. (Legal barriers are, for example, regulations of certain activities; "other barriers" are de
facto barriers.).
310 The Regulation, art. 2(l)(b) supra note 6, at 3. -
311 "Form CO," supra note 133, § 5.3, at 16.
312 Id. § 6.10 at 18.
313 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 50.
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scale,314 without causing a substantial price response in the market.
3 15
Furthermore, growing demand makes it more attractive for firms to
enter the market.316 The notifying firms must also provide "an estimate
of the value and source of imports to the relevant geographic market"
and then estimate the extent to which these imports are affected by any
tariff or non-tariff barriers to trade.3 17 The Commission may use this
information to determine whether foreign firms are potential entrants.
Easy access for foreign firms would make it difficult for a domestic firm
to raise its price above the competitive level.
The Commission will also consider whether substantial entry has
occurred in the past and whether it is likely to occur in the future.318
Moreover, the Commission will analyse the various factors influencing
market entry.319 Cost of entry is an important factor in this analysis.
320
Finally the Commission will consider the importance of research and de-
velopment (R&D) in the relevant market.321 If R&D is crucial to the
firm's ability to compete over the long term, potential entrants will be
reluctant as time is needed to develop R&D facilities and personnel.3 2 2
Finally, patents may completely block entry, or if they can be acquired,
impose higher costs on entrants.
323
The factors used by the EC Commission in analyzing ease of entry
will not differ much from the ones used by the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice. It seems, however, that the Commission will give great considera-
tion as to whether the market affected by the proposed merger is open to
international competition. It is noteworthy that the notification form re-
quires the parties to provide a comparison of prices charged by the group
to which they belong, in each of the Member States, as well as a compari-
son of price levels between the European Community and its major trad-
ing partners, e.g. the United States, Japan, and EFTA countries.32 4
314 The minimum viable scale (MVS) is a measure ofscale economies. It measures the break-even
scale of production. "The MVS is defined as the minimum production level a hypothetical entrant
must achieve in order to be a viable competitor.[sic] (Le., earn 'normal' returns in the industry) at
some specified level of product prices." Salop and Simons, supra note 10, at 684.
315 Salop and Simons, supra note 10, at 686.
316 Id at 689. When demand is stagnant or declining, large scale entry will create excess capacity
and cause prices to go down. This in turn will lower future profits and retard entry.
317 "Form CO," supra note 133, §§ 5.8, 5.10.
318 Id §§ 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3., at 16.
319 Id § 6.4, at 17.
320 Iyd
321 Id § 6.6, at 17.
322 Salop and Simons, supra note 10, at 683.
323 _d.
324 "Form CO", supra note 133, § 5.7, at 16.
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C. Efficiency benefits
"Efficiency benefits" are among the criteria the Commission will use
to appraise concentrations under the new Regulation. Article 2(1)(b) of
the Regulation directs the Commission to take into account "the devel-
opment of technical and economic progress provided that it is to Con-
sumer advantage and does not form an obstacle to Competition. 325 In
the United States, the weight that should be given to the "efficiency bene-
fit" criterion has been a source of great controversy.326 The European
Commission will also face this issue and have to decide when efficiency-
creating concentrations should be allowed, even though they otherwise
create or strengthen a dominant position. The Commission's Report ac-
knowledges that mergers may enhance efficiencies, particularly in tech-
nology-intensive European industries which are currently in a weak
position.327 The report notes that a lot of European firms are smaller
than their American and Japanese rivals, thus preventing them from tak-
ing full advantage of economies of scale.
Some commentators justifiably thought that the new EC Regulation
adopted a broad interpretation of the efficiency concept and provided a
325 The Regulation, art. 2(l)(b). See also Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the Euro-
pean Community, supra note 31, at 52. (The Commission's report indicates the importance of the
efficiency issue).
326 Some commentators have argued that consideration of factors such as efficiency benefits re-
duce predictability and certainty. See, Introductory Remarks of Phillip A. Proger, supra note 19, at
323-24 (reviewing the shift from strict use of structural factors in merger analysis to include non-
structural factors); Bork, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74
HARV. L. REv. 226 (1960)(advocating a "clear and simple" approach to merger analysis). Tradi-
tionally, in United States law, efficiency was considered only in certain circumstances. In United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963), the Supreme Court used a strict structural
analysis, considering only the combined merged firm's market share and the overall market concen-
tration; other evidence could only be used to rebut the presumption created by the structural evi-
dence. Eleven years later, in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974), the
Court rejected the presumption of the structural evidence, and recognized that other factors were
relevant.
The 1984 US Merger Guidelines, symbolize increasing willingness under U.S. law to consider
factors such as "efficiency benefits." The Guidelines specifically state that the Department will be
able to consider any efficiency in any case. See Baker, The 1984 Justice Department Guidelines, 53
ANTrrRusr L.J. 327, 332-333. In recent U.S. joint venture history, the FrC has taken a broad view
by approving the controversial General Motors-Toyota joint venture agreement. 46 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 48. The FTC weighed the "potential efficiency benefits" against "antitrust
concerns," and determined that "the continued competition between the companies will dwarf the
limited area of cooperation." Id. at 54. The parties to the joint venture were the United State's
largest and Japan's largest automobile manufacturers, number one and number three respectively in
the world automobile manufacturing market. Id. For a general discussion of efficiency considera-
tions, see Ponsoldt and Westerhausen, supra note 81, at 301-307.
327 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 52.
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strong efficiency defense.328 However, the idea of an efficiency defense
has been rejected by Sir Leon Brittan, the Commissioner responsible for
competition policy.329 This seems to indicate that once a dominant posi-
tion which significantly impedes cometition has been found efficiency
benefits cannot be considered as a defense.330 The "development of tech-
nical and economic progress" provided for in Article 2 should thus be
taken into account with the other criteria when determining whether the
concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position which signifi-
cantly impedes competition in the Common Market.
Article 2(1)(b) indicates that the development of technical and eco-
nomic progress should be considered only to the extent that "it is to con-
sumers' advantage and does not form an obstacle to competition." 331
The May 1989 report places the burden upon the parties in the concen-
tration to prove that there are efficiency gains and that they could not be
attained by any other alternative.3 32 Interestingly, the May 1989 report
states that the Commission is likely to require more than general state-
ments about the possibilities of rationalization or synergies. 333
Whether technical and economic progress is considered as a defense
to a decisioin of incompatibility or as one criterion in the overall ap-
praisal, it is clearly not competition-related. During the negotiations,
Member States, such as Germany and the U.K., insisted that the ap-
praisal of concentrations only be based on competition-related criteria.
On the other hand, States such as Spain, Portugal, and Italy demanded
that industrial policy considerations be also taken into account.3 34 As a
328 See ABA Spring Meeting Probes of FTC, State & Foreign Enforcement Trends, 56 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1911, at 559 (April 13, 1989). (Opinion of F. Glynn, Jr., Assistant
Director of International Antitrust in the FTC's Bureau of Competition).
329 The Principles and Practice of Merger Policy in the European Community, Address of the
Right Honourable Sir Leon Brittan, Center for European Policy Studies, Brussels September 24,
1990.
330 Discussion of EC Merger Control Regulation by commentators during 1990 Fordham Corpo-
rate Law Institute, International Mergers and Joint Ventures, New York, October 18-19, 1990.
331 The Regulation, art. 2(l)(b), supra note 6, at 3.
332 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 52. The standard
implemented by the U.S. Department of Justice is similar but might be more stringent. The 1984 US
Merger Guidelines states in Section 3.5:
Some mergers that the Department otherwise might challenge may be reasonably necessary to
achieve significant net efficiencies. If the parties to the merger establish by clear and convincing
evidence that a merger will achieve such efficiencies, the Department will consider those effi-
ciencies in deciding whether to challenge the merger.... In addition, the Department will reject
claims of efficiencies if equivalent or comparable savings can reasonably be achieved by the
parties through other means.
1984 U.S. Merger Guidelines, supra note 10, § 3.5.
333 Horizontal Mergers and Competition Policy in the EC, supra note 31, at 52.
334 Thieffry, The New EC Merger Control Regulation, 24 INTL L. 543 (1990). Member States of
the European Community have different views about the role of merger control as part of their
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result of compromise, the regulation's preamble mentions industrial pol-
icy considerations.335 Some are concerned that the reference to develop-
ment of technical and economic progress in Article 2 of the Regulation,
might be used to interpret the merger control Regulation as a tool for
industrial policy. 336 This concern seems justified in view of the amend-
ment of the EEC Treaty by the Single European Act, to include a provi-
sion on EC industrial policy.33 7 Moreover, the Regulation indicates that
the commission shall take into account "the structure of all the markets
concerned and the actual potential competition from undertakings lo-
cated either within or without the community. ' 331 Thus, the Commis-
sion is required to take international competition into account. Some are
worrying that the Commission might use the Regulation as a means of
creating "European champions" able to compete with non-community
companies. Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan denies having such an inten-
tion and has repeatedly stressed that competition will be the only
grounds for deciding whether or not to block a merger.339 However, the
distinction betwen competition policy rationale and other motivations is
difficult to make. By requiring the Commission to consider industrial
and regioinal policy as well as competition considerations, this aspect of
the new merger Regulation will make it more difficult for the Commis-
sion to resist political pressure. 40
D. Restrictions Ancillary to Concentrations
The preamble to the Regulation indicates that the new Regulation is
policy. Countries in which state intervention is traditional have used merger control in implement-
ing their industrial policy; while other countries have adopted a less-interventionist approach.
335 The 13th "Whereas" of the preamble of the Regulation states:
"Whereas it is necessary to establish whether concentrations with a Community dimension are
compatible or not with the common market from the point of view of the need to preserve and
develop effective competition in the common market; whereas, in so doing, the Commission
must place its appraisal within the general framework of the achievement of the fundamental
objectives referred to in Article 2 of the Treaty [of Rome], including that of strengthening the
Community's economic and social cohesion..
The Regulation, supra note 6, at 3.
336 See Fin. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at 19, col. 1.
337 The New Article 130.. of the EEC Treaty as added by the Single European Act, supra note 3,
states: "The Community's aim shall be to strengthen the scientific and technological basis of Euro-
pean industry and encourage it to become more competitive at the international level."
338 The Regulation, art. 2 (1)(a), supra note 6, at 3.
339 Fin. Times, Mar. 26, 1990, at 19, col.1.
340 EC Practitioners Question Ability to Deliver Effective Merger Review, supra note 130, at 53.
The Commission's Merger Task Force will undertake the analysis of notified concentrations. How-
ever, the Commissioners will make the final decision to allow or block a merger. Commission deci-
sions are taken on a collegial basis. Although the Commissioners act in the interest of the
Community and do not receive instructions from any National Government, they may have different
views about the industrial policy issue.
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not rendered inapplicable when the companies party to the merger, ac-
quisition or joint venture accept restrictions which are directly related
and necessary to the implementation of the concentration.341 Moreover,
Article 8(2) of the Regulation indicates that Commission decisions hold-
ing the concentration compatible with the common market will "also
cover restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of
the concentration".34 2 The purpose of this provision is to avoid parrallel
Commission proceedings which would occur by the Commission assess-
ing the concentration under the new Regulation on one hand, and apply-
ing Articles 85 and 86 to the restrictions ancillary to the concentration,
on the other hand. The Commission published guidelines which define
the notion of "restrictions directly related and necessary to the imple-
mentation of the concentration" and which describe how they will be
evaluated.34 3 The new Regulation requires that these restrictions be as-
sessed in relation to the concentration. Although they would have been
prohibited under Article 85 and 86 if they were considered in isolation or
in a different economic context, these restrictions may be allowed when
reviewed in relation to the concentration. In the context of the transfer
of a company, such ancillary restrictions include non-competition clauses
imposed upon the seller, licenses of industrial and commercial property
rights and know-how, and purchase and supply agreements. 3 " The
guidelines also cover ancillary restrictions in the case of joint acquisitions
and in the case of concentrative joint ventures.345
Generally, for a particular restriction to be considered in relation
with the concentration under the new Regulation, it must be ancillary to
the implementation of the concentation, Le. "subordinate to the main
object of the concentration."3 46 If this condition is fulfilled, the restric-
tions are considered "directly related" to the concentration. The test to
determine if the restrictions are "necessary to the implementation of the
concentration" is whether the concentration could be implemented in
their absence. 34 7 The Commission will take into account the duration of
341 The 25th "Whereas" of the preamble to the Regulation states:
Whereas the application of this Regulation is not excluded where the undertakings concerned
accept restrictions directly related and necessary to the implementation of the
concentration..."
The Regulation, supra note 6, at 3.
342 The Regulation, art. 8(2), supra note 6, at 6.
343 Notice Regarding Ancillary Restrictions, supra note 9, at 5.
344 Notice Regarding Ancillary Restrictions, supra note 9, § III, at 6.
345 Id., §§ IV and V. For a description of concentrative joint ventures, see Section V (C) (1) of
this article.
346 Id Section 11(4).
347 Id. Section 11(5).
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the restriction, as well as its nature and geographic field of application.348
The restrictions should not exceed the reasonable requirements necessary
to implement the concentration. 349 The Commission also suggests that
the restriction adopted should be the alternative least restrictive to
competition.350
LX. LEGAL AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW REGULATION
A. Residual jurisdiction under Articles 85 and 86
In general, a regulation cannot modify or restrict the provisions of
the Treaty of Rome. Therefore, the new regulation on the control of
concentrations cannot undo the broad interpretations of Articles 85 and
86 set forth in Philip Morris351 and Continental Can.352 In other words,
Articles 85 and 86 will still apply to those concentrations which do not
fall within the scope of the new merger Regulation but may be charac-
terized as either maintaining restrictive practices between undertakings
or abusing a dominant position. If a merger is within the scope of the
Regulation, 353however, the Commission is not permitted to apply Arti-
cles 85 and 85 of the EEC Treaty. 4 It remains to be seen whether Arti-
cles 85 and 86 will be used in private actions in national courts.35 5
Member States and the EEC authorities currently have parallel ju-
risdiction with regard to the application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC
Treaty.35 6 In Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt,35 7 the Court of Justice ruled
that national authorities could apply their national laws to some restric-
tive practices, while the Commission was examining such practices. In
the Perfume cases,3 58 the Court confirmed that national authorities may
348 Id. Section 11(6).
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 British Am. Tobacco Co. Ltd. & RJ. Reynolds Indus. Inc. v. Commission, supra note 90.
352 Europemballage Corp. & Commission & Continental Can Co. v. Commission, 1973 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 215, 12 Common Mkt. L. R. 199.
353 Such as defined infra Section V of this article.
354 Article 22 (1) of the Regulation states: "This Regulation alone shall apply to concentrations as
defined in Article 3."
The Regulation, supra note 6, at 11.
Article 22 (2) of the Regulation indicates that Regulation No. 17, supra note 101, implementing
Articles 85 and 86 shall not apply to concentrations covered by the new Regulation. Id.
355 Fine, supra note 6, at 523.
356 Verstrynge, The Relationship between National and Community Antitrust Law: an Overview of
the Perfumes Cases, 3 Nw. J. INT'L. & Bus. 358, 368 (1981).
357 Wilhelm v. Bundeskartellamt, [1969] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1969] Comm. Mkt. L. R. 100.
358 Procureur de la Republique v. Bruno Giry and Guerlain S.A. and Others, [1980] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 2327, [1981] Comm. Mkct. L. R. 99.
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take action regarding situations which are also within the Commission's
jurisdiction. Under European law, the competition rules of the Treaty of
Rome are directly applicable in the Member States, without the enact-
ment of a national law.3 59 Thus national courts of the Member States are
required to apply Articles 85 and 86.360 Therefore, a private litigant
could assert the direct applicability of Article 86 to a concentration,
based on the authority of the Continental Can case.
361
In the case of concentrations with Community dimension, it is likely
that a national court would be reluctant to grant an injunction to prevent
the concentration, because the Commission would clearly have jurisdic-
tion. However, this legal point is uncertain and may give rise to litiga-
tion at the European Court of Justice level. In the case of a
concentration that lacks Community dimension, a litigant in a national
court could raise Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome. The application of
Article 86 by the national court would be contrary to the intended distri-
bution of competence under the new Regulation. One approach to this
conflict has been suggested by the English court, which in the Plessey v.
GEC/Siemens case refused to grant an injunction when the Commission
was already involved.362
Articles 85 and 86 will still apply to those practices not encom-
passed by the term "concentration" as defined in Article 3. For example,
359 In order to ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of Community law, Article
177 of the Treaty of Rome, gives jurisdiction to the European Court of Justice to make preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of the EEC Treaty as well as on regulations, decisions and directives of
the Community institutions. As a result of cases brought before it under Article 177, the European
Court of Justice has expressly formulated two fundamental principles of Community law. First, in
van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, [1963] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1,
[1963] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 105 (reference for preliminary ruling), the Court established that provi-
sions of the Treaty as well as acts by the Community institutions have direct effect, (Le., can create
rights for private persons that national courts are bound to protect). Second, the Court developed in
Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E. Comm. CL J. Rep. 585, [1964] Comm. Mkt. L.R. 425 (reference for
preliminary ruling), the fundamental principle that Community law prevails over conflicting na-
tional law. See Stuart, The Court of Justice of the European Communities: the Scope of its Jurisdic-
tion and the Evolution of its Case Law under the EEC Treaty, 3 Nw. J. INT'L. & Bus. 415, 421-427
(1981).
360 The Court of Justice has repeatedly held that because of the direct applicability of Articles 85
and 86 in Member States, national courts should apply these competition rules. See, e.g., Belgische
Radio en Televisie and Societe belge des auteurs, compositeurs et editeurs v. SV Sabam and NV
Fonior, [1974] E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 51; [1974] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 238, stating that the prohibi-
tions of Article 85(1) and 86 create direct rights for individuals, which the national courts must
protect.
361 Supra note 86.
362 The Plessey Co. v. the General Electric Co., Siemens, [1990] ECC 384 (1988). The English
High Court, Chancery division, refused to grant injunctions to either party in the attempted take-
over of Plessey by the Siemens-GEC consortium, when the bid had been referred to the EC Commis-
sion under article 85, but before the Commission had decided upon it.
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Article 3(2) of the Regulation excludes certain joint ventures, in which
the parties remain independent and only coordinate their behavior (in
practice, cartels), in contrast to joint ventures "performing on a lasting
basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. '363 The Com-
mission's control of those joint ventures not within the scope of the Reg-
ulation is not limited by any quantitative threshold. These cartels could
also be subject to investigations by the national authorities of Member
States. As a result, companies may have to notify both the Commission
and the national authorities because it is difficult to determine what con-
stitutes' a joint venture in the scope of the regulation and what does
not. 36
B. Increased Litigation
The Regulation gives unlimited jurisdiction to the European Court
of Justice to review decisions "whereby the Commission has fixed a fine
or periodic penalty payments. ' 365 Furthermore, under Article 173 of the
Treaty of Rome, the European Court of Justice is competent to review
any decision of the Commission on appeal.36 6 Appeal may thus be taken
against Commission's decisions at the various stages of the procedure. It
has been argued -that appealing a Commission decision will be a good
defensive block to mergers or acquisitions.367
Some of the cases will be reviewed by the newly established Court of
First Instance. 65 The Court of First Instance has jurisdiction over cases
363 See supra Section V (C)(1) of this article.
364 Id.
365 The Regulation, art. 16, supra note 6, at 10.
366 Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome states:
The Court of Justice shall review the legality of acts of the Council and the Commission other
than recommendations or opinions. It shall for this purpose have jurisdiction in actions
brought by a Member State, the Council or the Commission on grounds of lack of competence,
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, infringement of this Treaty or of any rule
of law relating to its application, or misuse of powers.
Any natural or legal person may, under the same conditions, institute proceedings against
a decision addressed to that person or against a decision which, although in the form of a
regulation or a decision addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to the
former.
The proceedings provided for in this Article shall be instituted within two months of the
publication of the measure, or of its notification to the plaintiff, or, in the absence thereof, of the
day on which it came to the knowledge of the latter, as the case may be.
367 EC Practitioners Question Ability to Deliver Effective Merger Review, supra note 130.
368 In the Single European Act, supra note 3, Member States agreed that a Court should be
established to judge at first instance certain actions brought by legal and natural persons. Under the
Act the Court of Justice retained jurisdiction on cases brought by Member States or by Community
institutions, as well as the jurisdiction to make preliminary rulings under Article 177 of the EEC
Treaty. Slynn, Court of First Instance of the European Communities, 9 Nw. J. ITr'L. L. & Bus. 542,
544 (1989). Council Decision of 24 October establishing a Court of First Instance of the European
Communities, 31 O.3. EuR. COMM. (No. L 319) 1 (1988).
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brought by natural and legal persons against the Commission, relating to
the implementation of competition rules.369 Such cases will be subject to
a right of appeal to the European Court of Justice on points of law
only.370 Other cases, including appeals by Member States against a deci-
sion as to the existence of a distinct market in a Member State371 or on
the admissibility of a legitimate interest,37 2 will be appealed directly to
the Court of Justice. The Court will certainly follow the precedents set
under Articles 85 and 86. Under previous jurisprudence, the Court has
been reluctant to review the merits of economic decisions taken by the
Commission. However, the Court is expected to have a large influence in
the determination of the respective jurisdiction areas of the Commission
and Member States.
C. Lack of Manpower and Time Constraint.
About 50 concentration cases are anticipated per year and each case
will require a team of at least four specialists.373 The Comission had to
expand in order to fulfill it new mission. A special Merger Task Force
was created. It includes 48 members who come from other areas of the
Commission and national agencies.374 The team has ben criticized for its
"apparent remoteness from the business community.' '375  As far as new
staff is concerned, the Commission's applicant pool is probably limited to
nationals of the three Member States which have experienced people in
competition matters: the UK, the Federal Republic of Germany and
France.376 However, the Commission may experience difficulties in at-
tracting key people from industry.37 7 The expected decrease in the quan-
titative threshold should bring the number of mergers to be reviewed to
80. Expanding to the level required will be expensive and it is not clear
whether the necessary resources will be available.
Competition lawyers in London and Brussels are questioning the
ability of the EC Commission to deliver an effective merger review.378
Due to the complex consultative procedures provided by the Regulation
369 Slynn, supra note 368, at 545.
370 Id
371 The Regulation, art. 9. supra note 6, at 7; see infra Section VI of this article "Competence to
Review Concentrations," at -.
372 The Regulation, art. 21(3), supra note 6, at 11; see infra Section V of this article Competence to
Review Concentrations, at -
373 EC Practitioners Question Ability to Deliver Effective Merger Review, supra note 130.
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the time scales for the Commission to review concentrations and issue
decisions may be unrealistic. The Commission has received notifica-
tions.379 Future decisions from the Commission will hopefully provide
more guidance on the Commission's ability to fulfill its new mission.
XI. CONCLUSION
The new Regulation is designed to fill the present void in merger
control which existed until September 1990. However, the Regulation
and long-awaited EC Merger Control Guidelines raise serious concerns
about the new system's ability to meet businesses' and administrators'
expectations and understandable desires for certainty. Partly due to the
vast differences in merger control experience of the various Member
States, the new Regulation and Guidelines have compromised several of
the principles they set out to follow.
The Commission intended to offer businesses a "one-stop" system.
However, the scope of the Regulation fails to cover a large part of the
current activity in a comprehensive manner. First, the efforts to abolish
jurisdictional uncertainty have not been successful. The exceptions to
the Commission's jurisdiction are numerous. As the standards of merger
control still vary widely among Member States, problems such as parallel
litigation and forum shopping will persist. Second, although definitional
uncertainty has been reduced from the inadequate provisions of Articles
85 and 86, the Regulation's rules and the Guidelines still require clarifi-
cation. Efforts to deal with the ambiguities will result in litigation ex-
379 The first notification concerned the Renault-Volvo deal. 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 254) 3
(1990). The Commission declared that concentration compatible with the Common Market on No-
vember 6, 1990. 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 281) 3 (1990). For other notifications see e.g. notifica-
tion of the constitution of joint ventures between NV Amev, the third largest Dutch insurer, and
Compagnie Financiere et de Reassurance du Groupe AG SA, the leading Belgian insurance com-
pany. 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 268) 8 (1990). The Commission has announced that it will not
oppose the plan. Comm. Press Release IP (90) 941, Nov. 22, 1990; Notification of a proposed con-
centration by which Imperial Chemical Industries, a leading manufacturer of chemical and related
products acquires from Cookson Group a 50% holding in Tioxide Group, which produces titanium
pigments and related chemical products, 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 278) 15 (1990); notification of
the acquisition by Diasa, controlled by Promodes, of Dirsa, both companies being in the retail distri-
bution of foodstuffs; notification of the acquisition by Cargill PLC of the United Agriculture
Merchants Limited PLC from Unilever PLC, 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 293) 8 (1990). On De-
cember 20, 1990, The Commission decided not to oppose the notified concentration, 33 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. C 327) 14 (1990); notification of the acquisition by Matsushita of MCA, 33 O.J. Eur.
Comm. (No. C 307) 2 (1990); notification of the acquisition by AT&T of NCR, 33 O.J. Eur. Comm.
(No. C 310) 23 (1990); notification of a "strategic alliance" between Fiat and Compagnie Generale
d'Electricite, 33 O.3. Eur. Comm. (No. C 315) 13 (1990); see also EUROPE, November 1990, at 43,
col. 2; notification of the acquisition by Sicind SpA controlled by the group FIAT of 50.1% of
thecapetal of CEAC form the Compagnie Generale d'Electricite, 33 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. C 315)
14 (1990).
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pense and delay. Third, although the Regulation has made significant
headway in reducing procedural uncertainty, administrative feasibility
remains to be seen.
While the new Regulation and implementing Guidelines will con-
tinue to present merging businesses with a fair amount of uncertainty,
they are nonetheless a step in the development of a conmprehensive
merger control system within the European Community. Further modi-
fications in the Regulation and Guidelines will likely occur as the system
develops. For example, the quantitative threshold is expected to be low-
ered by 1993.380 Furthermore, if the United States experience is any in-
dication, the perceived need for dual systems will over time be reduced as
the primacy of Community control over competition becomes further es-
tablished and the Community becomes increasingly integrated
commercially.
In the interim, certain businesses stand to gain from a system that
promises unified controls and a reduction of uncertainty in selected ar-
eas. One such benefit should be the reduced uncertainty of multiple pro-
ceedings that the new clearance procedure will provide. The clearance
procedure should also prevent the possibility of the Commission stepping
in once a merger has been consumed.381 As the European merger sys-
tem develops over the coming years, the business community should
stress the need for greater certainty in Community coverage procedures
and guidelines. This first effort, which has survived nearly twenty years,
will be a success only if it is followed up with practical modifications over
the next few years.
380 The threshold is expected to be lowered to ECU 2 billion after December 31, 1992. See 1992:
The External Impact of European Unification, supra note 112.
381 An example of the Commission's present power to step in after the fact is illustrated by the
Douwe Egberts - Van Nelle takeover. In July 1990, the Commission decided that the takeover in
February 1989 by Douwe Egberts, the leading Dutch tobacco, coffee and toiletries company, of its
biggest Benelux rival in coffee, Van Nelle, was illegal. Douwe Egberts is owned by Sara Lee, the
large American food company. Brussels to Act Against Dutch Coffee Merger, Fin. Times, Jul. 25,
1990 at 1, col 7-8.
